



1  
00:00:11,639 --> 00:00:17,729  
John Greenwald: His name is  
John Ramirez. A retired CIA

2  
00:00:17,729 --> 00:00:22,499  
officer, John spent 25 years  
with the agency specializing in

3  
00:00:22,499 --> 00:00:28,439  
ballistic missile defense  
systems. And signals analysis of

4  
00:00:28,439 --> 00:00:33,539  
weapon system radars. And along  
the way, he's learned some stuff

5  
00:00:33,539 --> 00:00:36,479  
that he now feels he wants to  
share with the world. And

6  
00:00:36,480 --> 00:00:41,160  
John Ramirez: then we have what  
appears to be balls of energy.

7  
00:00:41,610 --> 00:00:44,790  
That's the best way I can  
describe it, that people have

8  
00:00:44,790 --> 00:00:45,510  
also seen,

9  
00:00:45,689 --> 00:00:49,049  
John Greenwald: but he is no  
whistleblower. The information

10  
00:00:49,049 --> 00:00:53,369  
he's about to share comes after  
a CIA Review of the information

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00:00:53,369 --> 00:00:56,939

he wants to convey. And they gave their approval that John

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00:00:56,939 --> 00:01:02,039

can talk about at all. This doesn't mean the CIA endorses

13

00:01:02,039 --> 00:01:06,659

his information, but rather, it was reviewed by the CIA to

14

00:01:06,659 --> 00:01:12,269

ensure no classified information is given to you or me. So what

15

00:01:12,269 --> 00:01:16,949

does he want to share that the CIA is okay with? Well, how

16

00:01:16,949 --> 00:01:20,249

about knowledge about a working group within the intelligence

17

00:01:20,249 --> 00:01:24,959

community studying orbs? Or how about the reality that

18

00:01:24,959 --> 00:01:29,669

internally, CIA personnel within the agency talked about UFO

19

00:01:29,669 --> 00:01:32,999

related events? And yes, so much more,

20

00:01:33,000 --> 00:01:34,470

John Ramirez: I saw my orb.

21

00:01:34,800 --> 00:01:38,010

John Greenwald: Stay tuned,  
you're about to journey inside

22

00:01:38,010 --> 00:01:38,940  
the black vault.

23

00:02:05,670 --> 00:02:08,190  
That's right, everybody. As  
always, thank you so much for

24

00:02:08,190 --> 00:02:11,640  
tuning in. And taking this  
journey inside the black vault

25

00:02:11,640 --> 00:02:15,300  
with me. I'm your host, John  
Greenwald, Jr. and I've got a

26

00:02:15,300 --> 00:02:17,910  
very special guest today,  
someone that I've wanted to talk

27

00:02:17,910 --> 00:02:22,890  
to on this program for quite  
some time, he has definitely

28

00:02:23,070 --> 00:02:26,670  
popped onto the scene here and  
has done quite a few interviews,

29

00:02:26,910 --> 00:02:31,230  
and a very popular guest where  
he appears, and rightfully so

30

00:02:31,230 --> 00:02:34,740  
he's got a lot of information to  
share. John Ramirez. John, thank

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00:02:34,740 --> 00:02:38,220  
you so much for joining me on

the program and taking a little

32

00:02:38,220 --> 00:02:40,858  
bit of time with me in my  
audience. Well, John,

33

00:02:40,859 --> 00:02:44,339  
John Ramirez: thank you for  
having me. And so your audience

34

00:02:44,339 --> 00:02:47,609  
might be interested to know a  
little backstory. When I was

35

00:02:47,609 --> 00:02:51,179  
attending some of these UFO  
conferences with a colleague of

36

00:02:51,179 --> 00:02:56,039  
mine. You were waiting to go on  
stage. And we actually talked to

37

00:02:56,039 --> 00:03:00,119  
you when you're like very young,  
many, you know, I believe it

38

00:03:00,119 --> 00:03:02,639  
will say conference in Orange  
County, you That's right. As for

39

00:03:02,639 --> 00:03:05,819  
Orange County, and when you went  
up on stage to do your

40

00:03:05,819 --> 00:03:09,449  
presentation, he and I looked at  
each other kind of smiled and

41

00:03:09,449 --> 00:03:14,519  
said, you know, that guy really

needs to talk to us. And here I

42

00:03:14,519 --> 00:03:18,479

am talking to you. So I consider that as a circle that was close.

43

00:03:18,479 --> 00:03:22,469

360 degrees, we close that circle, with my appearance with

44

00:03:22,469 --> 00:03:22,769

you.

45

00:03:23,070 --> 00:03:26,730

John Greenwald: Yeah. And I'm excited about it. I was was

46

00:03:26,730 --> 00:03:31,470

surprised when you had reminded me because I remember, I if you

47

00:03:31,470 --> 00:03:34,650

recall where we were standing. If I was on stage, it was to the

48

00:03:34,650 --> 00:03:39,060

right before I went on. And when you guys had approached me, and

49

00:03:39,060 --> 00:03:44,070

you had mentioned CIA? I did hope I didn't show it to you.

50

00:03:44,070 --> 00:03:47,160

But I think I started sweating a little bit going, why aren't

51

00:03:47,160 --> 00:03:50,940

people from the CIA here, you know, waiting to watch me go up

52

00:03:50,940 --> 00:03:54,060  
on stage. But I'm glad you  
reminded me. And that was quite

53

00:03:54,060 --> 00:03:57,000  
a few years ago, like I said,  
and it's great to have you on

54

00:03:57,000 --> 00:04:00,780  
the program and be able to pick  
your brain now that you have

55

00:04:00,780 --> 00:04:07,260  
retired from your 25 year career  
in the CIA, and have decided to

56

00:04:07,260 --> 00:04:11,130  
come out and start talking  
openly about topics that I would

57

00:04:11,130 --> 00:04:16,590  
say not a whole lot of CIA  
agents personnel like to talk

58

00:04:16,590 --> 00:04:18,630  
about and let me ask you, I  
wanted to ask you before the

59

00:04:18,630 --> 00:04:22,290  
show, what is an accurate term  
for you? Were you an agent or

60

00:04:22,290 --> 00:04:25,500  
were you a employee? What's  
what's what's proper?

61

00:04:26,130 --> 00:04:28,770  
John Ramirez: Well, we're not  
agents. There are no agents in

62

00:04:28,770 --> 00:04:33,270

CIA. We hire agents, their  
foreign nationals, that for a

63

00:04:33,270 --> 00:04:37,200

compensation could be monetary  
goods and services. They agree

64

00:04:37,200 --> 00:04:40,470

to spy against their own  
government because they have

65

00:04:40,470 --> 00:04:44,520

access into their own government  
and provide us with information.

66

00:04:44,910 --> 00:04:50,970

And so that is a major reason  
why there's so much secrecy and

67

00:04:50,970 --> 00:04:58,320

a lot of our most valuable  
intelligence sources are people

68

00:04:58,320 --> 00:05:03,360

who, if the information was  
known publicly, and only, like a

69

00:05:03,360 --> 00:05:06,570

very few people would have that  
information in his or her

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00:05:06,570 --> 00:05:11,850

country, their lives will be at  
stake. And so that's a very

71

00:05:11,850 --> 00:05:15,090

precarious situation for them  
and for us, because exposes our

72

00:05:15,090 --> 00:05:19,650  
sources, it may expose other  
sources if they interrogate this

73

00:05:19,650 --> 00:05:25,260  
person. And also the method of  
extraction method sources and

74

00:05:25,260 --> 00:05:28,530  
methods, the method of  
extraction becomes very fragile,

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00:05:28,560 --> 00:05:32,070  
we won't be able to use that  
extraction method ever again.

76

00:05:32,670 --> 00:05:36,570  
And so that's why a lot of the  
secrecy occurs. And so it's not

77

00:05:36,570 --> 00:05:40,620  
like we're hiding information.  
It's more like, we need to

78

00:05:40,620 --> 00:05:43,920  
protect these sources of  
methods, because we may want to

79

00:05:43,920 --> 00:05:48,360  
use the source, again, or other  
sources, and we need to protect

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00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:52,170  
how we get information out of  
that country, an adversarial

81

00:05:52,170 --> 00:05:59,250  
country, to the United States.  
And so that's that type of

82

00:05:59,250 --> 00:06:02,220

person is an agent. I see. No,

83

00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:04,260

John Greenewald: no. How would you describe yourself?

84

00:06:04,860 --> 00:06:07,680

John Ramirez: Officers?

Officers, guys, officers? Yeah.

85

00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:14,070

So operations officers, analytic officers, Science and Technology

86

00:06:14,070 --> 00:06:17,670

Officers, it could be logistics officers, you name it. I gotcha.

87

00:06:17,760 --> 00:06:21,840

The full gamut of all of our positions, were just officers.

88

00:06:22,290 --> 00:06:24,210

John Greenewald: So I want to talk a little bit, just for a

89

00:06:24,210 --> 00:06:27,480

couple minutes about what you did for the CIA. I spoke a

90

00:06:27,480 --> 00:06:29,640

little bit about it in the introduction, everybody just

91

00:06:29,640 --> 00:06:36,750

saw, but as I just mentioned, 25 years, you were quite busy in

92

00:06:36,750 --> 00:06:40,800  
that in that timeframe. Give me  
a nutshell version about those

93

00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:45,660  
25 years if you can, and what  
did you do for the for the CIA?

94

00:06:46,290 --> 00:06:48,990  
John Ramirez: Okay, so what I  
can talk about is signals

95

00:06:48,990 --> 00:06:52,860  
intelligence. Everyone knows  
that the National Security

96

00:06:52,860 --> 00:06:56,070  
Agency does analysts  
intelligence, their the

97

00:06:56,070 --> 00:07:00,450  
functional mission manager, the  
director of NSA, what we call

98

00:07:00,450 --> 00:07:04,080  
danza is the functional Mission  
Manager for signals

99

00:07:04,080 --> 00:07:10,170  
intelligence, CIA does human  
intelligence or human and open

100

00:07:10,170 --> 00:07:14,130  
source intelligence, oh cent.  
And so that's our, that's our

101

00:07:14,130 --> 00:07:21,000  
focus. But within the CIA, there  
are other capabilities that are

102

00:07:21,000 --> 00:07:25,680

also capabilities and other agencies. But the focus of our

103

00:07:25,680 --> 00:07:32,010

capabilities is to support operations. So from a citizen

104

00:07:32,040 --> 00:07:38,100

telogen standpoint, our second officers deploy to protect

105

00:07:38,640 --> 00:07:43,440

operations, they may do counter surveillance, they may provide

106

00:07:43,920 --> 00:07:48,960

gadgets, in order to do some of that extraction that I talked

107

00:07:48,960 --> 00:07:55,560

about is highly sensitive. So in my role, I did electronic

108

00:07:55,560 --> 00:08:00,120

intelligence, and electronic intelligence is the analysis of

109

00:08:00,240 --> 00:08:05,040

weapons related radar signals, missile seekers, air defense

110

00:08:05,040 --> 00:08:10,950

radar systems associated with larger weapon systems. And so we

111

00:08:10,950 --> 00:08:14,700

would like collect signals and analyze them in a lab

112

00:08:15,960 --> 00:08:19,740

to get the internals of that  
signal. When I mean by

113

00:08:19,740 --> 00:08:24,090

internals, we want to reverse  
engineer that radar just based

114

00:08:24,090 --> 00:08:28,830

on the signals that we collect.  
And any photographs may we may

115

00:08:28,830 --> 00:08:32,880

have, of the source, the radar  
antennas, for example, we can

116

00:08:32,880 --> 00:08:36,150

measure, combined with the  
signals combined with other

117

00:08:36,150 --> 00:08:40,410

information provided by our  
overhead reconnaissance systems

118

00:08:40,650 --> 00:08:45,060

of how much power that we  
collected. And together, we can

119

00:08:45,060 --> 00:08:49,890

then model that radar system.  
And that information goes to a

120

00:08:49,890 --> 00:08:52,860

weapon systems analyst who's  
looking at for example, if it's

121

00:08:52,860 --> 00:08:56,700

a surface to air missile system,  
we might do the radar signals

122

00:08:56,700 --> 00:09:01,410

analysis for that system. And they may do the interceptor, the

123

00:09:01,410 --> 00:09:05,430

actual shooting in of that weapon system, combining our

124

00:09:05,430 --> 00:09:10,920

data with the interceptor data, they'll have a better picture of

125

00:09:10,920 --> 00:09:17,070

that system. Now dia does the same thing. Dia has the missile

126

00:09:17,070 --> 00:09:20,010

and space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama. They also

127

00:09:20,010 --> 00:09:23,490

have a lab and they do the same thing. So what's the difference?

128

00:09:23,550 --> 00:09:28,320

Well, the DIA is more interested in an adversarial system

129

00:09:29,430 --> 00:09:35,010

performance against what we have in inventory. So when we look at

130

00:09:35,040 --> 00:09:40,590

a system, we're looking at the nuts and bolts and the internals

131

00:09:40,680 --> 00:09:44,400

of a system that is probably just being developed so they

132

00:09:44,430 --> 00:09:48,900  
don't have like hundreds of them  
scattered over a country that

133

00:09:48,900 --> 00:09:52,020  
would have just like one or two  
that they're working on, and

134

00:09:52,020 --> 00:09:58,020  
they test. But dia looks at the  
entire deployed system, what

135

00:09:58,020 --> 00:10:01,320  
they call the electronic order  
of battle. All the emanations

136

00:10:01,320 --> 00:10:05,070  
coming from deployed systems.  
And they model against what

137

00:10:05,070 --> 00:10:08,850  
we're flying because they need  
to inform policymakers. This

138

00:10:08,850 --> 00:10:13,080  
adversary has a new surface air  
missile system. And its

139

00:10:13,080 --> 00:10:18,540  
performance is this. And we  
have, let's say, the F two F 22,

140

00:10:18,540 --> 00:10:23,490  
F 35 fighter planes. And we know  
the, the performance of those

141

00:10:23,490 --> 00:10:28,680  
fighter planes. And they have to  
model and simulate what our

142

00:10:28,680 --> 00:10:33,300

planes can do against that system, or what that system can

143

00:10:33,300 --> 00:10:37,140

do against our planes. So the DIA does that type of work in

144

00:10:37,140 --> 00:10:41,730

great detail. And dia reports, you know, you heard dirt,

145

00:10:41,820 --> 00:10:47,100

there's just like a few pages, a DUI Defense Intelligence Report

146

00:10:47,100 --> 00:10:52,560

from the DIA, I see hundreds and hundreds of pages. And that's

147

00:10:52,560 --> 00:10:56,220

one of the things that the IA doesn't like to release. And

148

00:10:56,220 --> 00:11:00,090

it's probably not foreseeable. Because it's extremely

149

00:11:00,090 --> 00:11:05,070

sensitive, because it reveals our capabilities. It reveals

150

00:11:05,250 --> 00:11:09,660

those capabilities that we need to work on in order to counter a

151

00:11:09,660 --> 00:11:13,650

weapon system that's deployed. And what we provide is weapon

152

00:11:13,650 --> 00:11:17,070

systems that are going to be  
deployed, so that they can cue

153

00:11:17,070 --> 00:11:21,270

up the acquisition side of the  
department saying, Okay, this

154

00:11:21,270 --> 00:11:26,490

adversary has this weapon system  
are our counter to that isn't as

155

00:11:26,490 --> 00:11:29,460

good, we need to either improve  
that weapon system or build a

156

00:11:29,460 --> 00:11:33,840

new one. And so that's the  
relationship of what we do

157

00:11:33,840 --> 00:11:39,270

versus let's NSA and dia. But we  
do have a lab. And surprisingly,

158

00:11:40,230 --> 00:11:44,490

every September is family day.  
So the family members who are

159

00:11:44,490 --> 00:11:50,670

uncleared to children, close  
relatives, of staff members and

160

00:11:50,670 --> 00:11:55,920

contractors invite their family  
members uncleared to tour the

161

00:11:55,920 --> 00:11:59,520

CIA, they practically have the  
full run of the house, as long

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00:11:59,520 --> 00:12:04,350

as they're escorted by a badged officer or a batch contractor.

163

00:12:04,980 --> 00:12:09,060

And so here's my top secret SCI lab and I would giving tours of

164

00:12:09,060 --> 00:12:12,960

my lab, and putting up demonstrations, pumping in

165

00:12:12,960 --> 00:12:17,130

signals to simulate a radar system, and just showing how we

166

00:12:17,130 --> 00:12:20,790

do things. So in a way, it's highly secret. But in a way,

167

00:12:20,790 --> 00:12:24,420

it's it's not the fact of it's not secret. So

168

00:12:24,480 --> 00:12:26,850

John Greenwald: you know, John, I could have happily have been

169

00:12:26,850 --> 00:12:31,170

your son that day, when we would go in there and no, that's

170

00:12:31,350 --> 00:12:34,890

fascinating. And and one of the other job titles that stuck out

171

00:12:34,890 --> 00:12:38,280

to me, which is one thing I want to deal with, before we we move

172

00:12:38,280 --> 00:12:41,370  
on from your background, is that  
you were a founding member of

173

00:12:41,370 --> 00:12:43,590  
the Office of the Director of  
National Intelligence is

174

00:12:43,860 --> 00:12:50,760  
national counterproliferation  
center or NC PC. Yeah. I believe

175

00:12:50,760 --> 00:12:55,560  
that the history of that office  
began at CIA then was moved. Is

176

00:12:55,560 --> 00:12:57,090  
that that correct? ODNI?

177

00:12:57,510 --> 00:13:01,110  
John Ramirez: Well, it's one of  
the offices that reside both at

178

00:13:01,110 --> 00:13:05,460  
CIA and at the ODNI level at  
CIA. It's the

179

00:13:05,460 --> 00:13:10,170  
counterproliferation division  
underneath the director of

180

00:13:10,170 --> 00:13:14,220  
operations. And in fact, the  
most infamous member of that

181

00:13:14,220 --> 00:13:18,600  
division, we all know, what's  
Valerie Plame? She worked for

182

00:13:18,600 --> 00:13:24,570  
CP, I worked for NCPC at the  
ODNI level where we have

183

00:13:24,870 --> 00:13:28,320  
counterproliferation efforts  
throughout the government. And

184

00:13:28,320 --> 00:13:33,570  
we were coordinating the United  
States government's response to

185

00:13:33,600 --> 00:13:41,160  
the tear, to stop proliferation  
of nuclear materials. And we

186

00:13:41,160 --> 00:13:44,070  
were making sure that at the  
policy, not the operational

187

00:13:44,070 --> 00:13:47,970  
level at the policy level, that  
we weren't doing things that

188

00:13:47,970 --> 00:13:52,380  
were redundant, that we were  
like providing resources to them

189

00:13:52,410 --> 00:13:57,000  
be advocates for resources to  
these other CP organizations,

190

00:13:57,270 --> 00:14:03,300  
such as at the FBI, national  
security branch, there is a CP

191

00:14:03,300 --> 00:14:09,690  
division at NSA, in a  
directorship called S director

192

00:14:09,690 --> 00:14:13,050

for cygan. And in a subdirectory, called s two,

193

00:14:13,080 --> 00:14:17,850

which is analysis and production, there is a office of

194

00:14:17,850 --> 00:14:20,700

counter proliferation. So there's just two examples of

195

00:14:20,700 --> 00:14:24,780

other counter proliferation efforts. So we want to make sure

196

00:14:24,780 --> 00:14:29,160

that we don't redundantly, like provide capabilities, that when

197

00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:33,810

we build something for the CP equity, that everyone has access

198

00:14:33,810 --> 00:14:38,220

to it, and they all can provide inputs into that capability. So

199

00:14:38,220 --> 00:14:43,380

that when we buy that capability through in our role, for

200

00:14:43,380 --> 00:14:46,230

example, with a defense contractor, let's say it's

201

00:14:46,230 --> 00:14:48,510

Lockheed Martin Building a satellite or something like

202

00:14:48,510 --> 00:14:52,470  
that, that all of their equities  
are addressed in that sensor

203  
00:14:52,470 --> 00:14:56,220  
system. And all the capabilities  
they want that to do so we

204  
00:14:56,220 --> 00:14:59,970  
brokered that kind of like, and  
I could speak on the second

205  
00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:04,470  
aside, and we also have biology  
and nuclear as the other parts

206  
00:15:04,470 --> 00:15:05,340  
of NBC.

207  
00:15:05,520 --> 00:15:08,850  
John Greenwald: Yeah. Valerie  
Plame is a name I haven't heard

208  
00:15:08,910 --> 00:15:12,390  
in quite a few years. It's  
funny, bring her up, and you

209  
00:15:12,390 --> 00:15:15,480  
refreshed my memory on a couple  
FOIA cases that I had many, many

210  
00:15:15,480 --> 00:15:18,900  
years ago. But that's a  
different show in itself. So So

211  
00:15:18,900 --> 00:15:21,900  
let me ask you, somebody who's  
involved in that type of work

212  
00:15:21,900 --> 00:15:24,150

and weapons systems. And obviously, you answered one of

213

00:15:24,150 --> 00:15:27,810  
my other questions already. Your lab was top secret SCI. So you

214

00:15:27,810 --> 00:15:30,870  
were highly cleared at these levels? It's kind of obvious.

215

00:15:30,870 --> 00:15:36,540  
But you know, just to set that up, how do you have a focus like

216

00:15:36,540 --> 00:15:42,450  
that with the CIA, and wind up at UFO conferences? And you, you

217

00:15:42,450 --> 00:15:46,590  
know, showed up at my at one of the, you know, my appearances?

218

00:15:47,820 --> 00:15:52,230  
What's that bridge? What got you into the UFO side of this? Was

219

00:15:52,230 --> 00:15:53,970  
it anything official or personal?

220

00:15:54,420 --> 00:15:56,610  
John Ramirez: Well, first of all, let me preface I don't

221

00:15:56,640 --> 00:16:01,740  
remember, we identified as CIA, I think because of the way we

222

00:16:01,740 --> 00:16:05,040

behaved, you might have some  
ISIS, the CIA,

223

00:16:05,070 --> 00:16:06,690  
John Greenwald: you might be  
right. But to be honest with

224

00:16:06,690 --> 00:16:11,250  
you, I could have maybe I could  
absolutely be wrong, and maybe I

225

00:16:11,250 --> 00:16:17,190  
picked up on it. But I remember  
being nervous. Like, why are

226

00:16:17,190 --> 00:16:20,430  
they in? And again, maybe it was  
just an assumption on my part.

227

00:16:21,090 --> 00:16:23,610  
So yeah, forgive me if I miss  
remembered that part.

228

00:16:23,850 --> 00:16:28,590  
John Ramirez: Yeah, we would not  
identify CIA and a sec to your

229

00:16:28,620 --> 00:16:34,890  
question. We went there, because  
we were personally interested.

230

00:16:35,220 --> 00:16:39,510  
And you follow it. So my friend  
and I, we were both

231

00:16:39,510 --> 00:16:45,210  
experiencers. And we both had  
sightings. And so we had an

232

00:16:45,210 --> 00:16:48,120

interest. But having that  
interest in CIA was not

233

00:16:48,150 --> 00:16:53,550  
official, both of us we informed  
CIA officer security, the fact

234

00:16:53,550 --> 00:16:56,460  
that we're going to this  
conference, the hotels were

235

00:16:56,460 --> 00:17:01,320  
staying at the flights were  
taking, and, and to verify that

236

00:17:01,380 --> 00:17:04,770  
we're paying for everything, the  
flights, the hotels and the

237

00:17:04,770 --> 00:17:08,820  
conference fees out of out of  
pocket, as long as they know

238

00:17:08,820 --> 00:17:12,900  
where we at. They didn't care  
where we went. And it's within

239

00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:16,500  
CONUS. So it's not like we're  
traveling overseas. Sure. So

240

00:17:16,500 --> 00:17:21,090  
that makes it a lot easier. So  
it was a personal interest. And

241

00:17:21,300 --> 00:17:27,210  
many people at CIA who worked in  
other areas, not even close to

242

00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:31,230

the weapons intelligence area I worked. But in other areas, were

243

00:17:31,230 --> 00:17:36,420

also hobbyists, I would say, of the entire topic. And I know

244

00:17:36,420 --> 00:17:40,320

that because I was an administrator of a discussion

245

00:17:40,380 --> 00:17:44,820

database, and Lotus Notes, which really dates the technology, IBM

246

00:17:44,820 --> 00:17:48,690

Lotus Notes, and they had little discussion database areas within

247

00:17:48,690 --> 00:17:54,690

Lotus Notes. And one of them is called the users group, th U G,

248

00:17:54,750 --> 00:17:59,430

and we put a little s, it is pronounced thugs. And all of a

249

00:17:59,430 --> 00:18:03,630

sudden, a lot of folks who served my time will remember Oh,

250

00:18:03,630 --> 00:18:06,630

that's that John Ramirez from thugs, because I was one of the

251

00:18:06,630 --> 00:18:09,750

administrators and I used to contribute a lot into the

252

00:18:09,840 --> 00:18:17,100

computer hobbyists that used to post in that particular data

253

00:18:17,100 --> 00:18:22,710  
discussion base. But one of the topics was like what DNI,

254

00:18:22,830 --> 00:18:27,360  
Abraham's calls the other topic. And so we had a catch all of

255

00:18:27,390 --> 00:18:32,160  
things that we just contributed. And that's where a lot of people

256

00:18:32,190 --> 00:18:39,660  
talked about the Anunnaki, the monuments on Mars, anomalies on

257

00:18:39,660 --> 00:18:42,780  
the on Mars and the Moon and things like that are mostly

258

00:18:42,780 --> 00:18:46,920  
speculative in nature. I brought up the remote viewing program,

259

00:18:48,180 --> 00:18:51,930  
and MK Ultra, and all these things that we all know from

260

00:18:51,960 --> 00:18:57,930  
foils that CIA was involved in, we just discussed it at that

261

00:18:57,930 --> 00:19:00,360  
level. And it's supposed to be on classified. So we're not

262

00:19:00,360 --> 00:19:03,690

going to put anything in there  
of a current operation or

263

00:19:03,690 --> 00:19:07,140  
current capability. Yeah, it's  
more historical looking back and

264

00:19:07,140 --> 00:19:13,920  
personal, personal experiences.  
And so in that context, that's

265

00:19:13,920 --> 00:19:19,290  
how I was able to interface with  
that entire topic at an

266

00:19:19,290 --> 00:19:22,440  
unofficial level. But having  
said that, I got phone calls on

267

00:19:22,440 --> 00:19:26,640  
the secure line, that what CIA  
officers are know the green

268

00:19:26,640 --> 00:19:30,510  
phone, so I say green phone,  
they know exactly what phone was

269

00:19:30,510 --> 00:19:34,770  
ringing. The green phone rang  
and people will tell me about

270

00:19:35,370 --> 00:19:39,060  
certain things that they  
witnessed in the course of their

271

00:19:39,060 --> 00:19:41,700  
careers, or even some in the  
course of their military

272

00:19:41,700 --> 00:19:45,990

careers. For example, the strong association with Navy and the

273

00:19:45,990 --> 00:19:49,800  
phenomenon. One CIA officer called me up and say, yeah, when

274

00:19:49,800 --> 00:19:55,590  
I was on the USS Boston, and we're off the coast of Vietnam,

275

00:19:55,950 --> 00:19:59,730  
we had to fight off a UFO. My ship went to German quarters and

276

00:19:59,730 --> 00:20:04,410  
we fought off a UFO. And I looked at the deployment of that

277

00:20:04,410 --> 00:20:09,810  
ship. And where we're when that ship was off the coast of

278

00:20:09,810 --> 00:20:14,790  
Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin, or what they call Yankee station.

279

00:20:15,810 --> 00:20:19,530  
There was nothing there that would even hint at that

280

00:20:19,530 --> 00:20:23,850  
occurring. I looked at the cruise, the cruise books at Navy

281

00:20:23,850 --> 00:20:27,810  
people know that when you go on like a cruise into the Pacific

282

00:20:27,840 --> 00:20:31,620

West packs or to the Met the Met  
cruises, that there's a cruise

283

00:20:31,620 --> 00:20:35,490

book Lord, I got high school  
annual. And I looked in there

284

00:20:35,490 --> 00:20:38,040

for any incidence of anything  
strange occur. And of course,

285

00:20:38,040 --> 00:20:41,070

that's not going to be in there.  
He affirmed that. Yeah, that

286

00:20:41,070 --> 00:20:44,910

happened. And so in that level,  
that's where I got involved with

287

00:20:45,750 --> 00:20:48,930

some what personal as well as  
semi official.

288

00:20:50,670 --> 00:20:53,130

John Greenwald: Let's talk  
about the semi official. Were

289

00:20:53,130 --> 00:20:56,550

you able to peek anybody's  
interest internally with the CIA

290

00:20:56,550 --> 00:20:59,910

about these types of reports  
that you were getting through

291

00:21:00,060 --> 00:21:03,570

through the thugs? Through the  
from the from your fellow thugs?

292

00:21:04,110 --> 00:21:06,750

Were you able to get people to be interested or what happened

293

00:21:06,750 --> 00:21:07,200  
with that?

294

00:21:07,500 --> 00:21:09,660  
John Ramirez: Well, I think they're like already interested.

295

00:21:09,660 --> 00:21:13,380  
And I met some of them for lunch. And we talked about it

296

00:21:13,410 --> 00:21:18,000  
like at lunch, going to the cafeteria. And we could talk

297

00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:21,270  
about it because it was personal, like experiences. Now,

298

00:21:21,450 --> 00:21:25,140  
there is no classified discussion at any cafeteria

299

00:21:25,320 --> 00:21:30,060  
tour. In the intelligence community. It's unclassified. So

300

00:21:30,060 --> 00:21:34,170  
we can't get into details about, you know, the professional side

301

00:21:34,710 --> 00:21:40,770  
of what we might have worked on. But it's all personal anecdotes

302

00:21:40,800 --> 00:21:46,080  
of what we experienced

ourselves. So at that level,

303

00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:51,300

yes, I was able to like, have a group of people just getting

304

00:21:51,300 --> 00:21:55,260

together at lunch on our own time because lunches our own

305

00:21:55,260 --> 00:22:00,090

time, and not doing doing it this during government hours,

306

00:22:00,120 --> 00:22:01,860

the eight hours we're we're working.

307

00:22:03,450 --> 00:22:05,670

John Greenwald: Is that what you refer to as the semi

308

00:22:05,670 --> 00:22:07,290

official aspect of it?

309

00:22:07,559 --> 00:22:09,989

John Ramirez: Right? The semi official came from those

310

00:22:09,989 --> 00:22:13,289

discussions. Plus when I got on the green phone, I gotcha.

311

00:22:13,589 --> 00:22:17,939

John Greenwald: Yeah. Which is fascinating. And I took notes

312

00:22:17,939 --> 00:22:23,129

about the USS Boston and Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin. But are

313

00:22:23,129 --> 00:22:27,989

there any other incidents that  
you received through the green

314

00:22:27,989 --> 00:22:31,229

phone or elsewhere, that stick  
out to you as being something

315

00:22:31,229 --> 00:22:35,639

that is not very well known or  
known at all in the UFO field,

316

00:22:35,639 --> 00:22:38,459

but something that on an  
official level? Or excuse me,

317

00:22:38,459 --> 00:22:44,129

from your time in the CIA, that  
you heard about? Anything that

318

00:22:44,129 --> 00:22:44,909

sticks out to you?

319

00:22:45,240 --> 00:22:47,970

John Ramirez: Well, I've already  
talked about this in my previous

320

00:22:48,330 --> 00:22:52,740

appearances about the or working  
group. And I

321

00:22:52,740 --> 00:22:54,600

John Greenwald: want to get  
into that, yeah. So that's a

322

00:22:54,600 --> 00:22:57,780

perfect transition. So what  
exactly is this orb Working

323

00:22:57,780 --> 00:22:58,230

Group?

324

00:22:58,859 --> 00:23:04,229

John Ramirez: Well, let's say that before any huge program is

325

00:23:04,229 --> 00:23:08,639

launched. And a program is something that requires dollars

326

00:23:08,639 --> 00:23:12,839

and cents to fund it requires a facility requires contractor

327

00:23:12,839 --> 00:23:16,799

support, administrative support, logistics, support, all of that,

328

00:23:16,829 --> 00:23:21,749

that that's real money. Before that occurs, there's always

329

00:23:21,749 --> 00:23:26,549

like, offline before that occurs, pre program, people

330

00:23:26,549 --> 00:23:30,029

getting together to kind of bound the problem, like what

331

00:23:30,149 --> 00:23:34,529

what are we looking at? What are we dealing with? And how do we

332

00:23:35,039 --> 00:23:39,779

approach this issue? So the world working group started

333

00:23:39,779 --> 00:23:44,639  
when, and I can say this,  
because the existence of orbs

334  
00:23:44,849 --> 00:23:49,169  
was officially disclosed. And  
James SLoCaT skis skinwalkers,

335  
00:23:49,169 --> 00:23:54,449  
in the Pentagon book, but we did  
see orbs, much like what they

336  
00:23:54,449 --> 00:23:59,519  
saw associated with a lot of the  
anecdotes from eyewitnesses in

337  
00:23:59,519 --> 00:24:02,579  
that book, so we saw orbs, and  
these were,

338  
00:24:02,609 --> 00:24:04,379  
John Greenwald: if I can  
interject, and I don't mean to

339  
00:24:04,379 --> 00:24:08,339  
John, just can you give a very  
brief definition? I know what an

340  
00:24:08,339 --> 00:24:12,599  
orb is. And I'm sure my does  
other members. Yeah, in the

341  
00:24:12,599 --> 00:24:15,299  
context of how you're referring  
to it what what is an orb?

342  
00:24:15,569 --> 00:24:19,799  
John Ramirez: Okay, so we have  
structural craft, the nuts and

343

00:24:19,799 --> 00:24:25,319  
bolts metallic craft that people  
have seen throughout the history

344  
00:24:25,319 --> 00:24:31,109  
of ufology and then we have what  
appears to be, but also of

345  
00:24:31,109 --> 00:24:35,219  
energy. That's the best way I  
can describe it. That people

346  
00:24:35,219 --> 00:24:38,549  
have also seen those are the  
orbs I'm talking about, okay.

347  
00:24:38,639 --> 00:24:42,599  
And so, we said well, people  
have seen these all along, but

348  
00:24:42,659 --> 00:24:50,219  
from officially some of these  
orbs cannot be seen. Unless you

349  
00:24:50,249 --> 00:24:54,149  
look at a spectrum outside of  
light, or actually below light

350  
00:24:54,149 --> 00:24:59,009  
infrared is being below light  
below red. And when that we have

351  
00:24:59,009 --> 00:25:03,449  
these capabilities Built into  
some of our spacecraft and turn

352  
00:25:03,449 --> 00:25:08,519  
them on, we are looking for,  
like launch detection. That's

353

00:25:08,519 --> 00:25:13,169  
its primary function. We're also  
looking for what's known as

354

00:25:13,169 --> 00:25:19,889  
change detection, we might be  
looking at a field that might be

355

00:25:19,889 --> 00:25:24,119  
used for narcotics production.  
And we want to know what changes

356

00:25:24,119 --> 00:25:27,149  
may have occurred over a period  
of time over that field. And

357

00:25:27,149 --> 00:25:31,949  
that gives them an idea of what  
might be going on. So that's,

358

00:25:31,979 --> 00:25:36,509  
that's the day job, if you will,  
of those sensors. What happened

359

00:25:36,509 --> 00:25:41,909  
was outside of that day job of  
doing just normal intelligence

360

00:25:41,909 --> 00:25:45,539  
collection, all of a sudden,  
they saw these balls of light.

361

00:25:46,439 --> 00:25:51,629  
And it wasn't like an anomaly,  
to the sense that what NASA

362

00:25:51,659 --> 00:25:56,879  
explains as dust or you know,  
particles or whatever, NASA lens

363

00:25:56,879 --> 00:26:01,829

flare, it wasn't that. And so it was something that was a

364

00:26:01,829 --> 00:26:11,069

tangible phenomenon. But not the can't be explained. And so

365

00:26:11,219 --> 00:26:14,009

originally, you know, when you get something like that, you

366

00:26:14,009 --> 00:26:17,519

want to filter it out. Because it's noise based on like, what

367

00:26:17,519 --> 00:26:19,379

you're really looking at, you don't want any of the noise

368

00:26:19,379 --> 00:26:22,919

there. So you want to like get rid of it from the data,

369

00:26:23,249 --> 00:26:25,499

subtract it from the data, because you just want to look at

370

00:26:25,529 --> 00:26:31,139

your target. Well, this kept appearing over and over. And it

371

00:26:31,139 --> 00:26:34,229

wasn't over the United States, because we don't turn on these

372

00:26:34,229 --> 00:26:37,919

sensors over the United States and a national technical means

373

00:26:37,919 --> 00:26:43,319  
sensors are not collecting  
against the United States. It's

374  
00:26:43,319 --> 00:26:48,089  
an adversary. And so over  
adversary airspace and space,

375  
00:26:48,419 --> 00:26:51,659  
here comes these these  
anomalies, and they kept

376  
00:26:51,659 --> 00:26:55,679  
happening to the point where,  
okay, now we got to pay

377  
00:26:55,679 --> 00:26:59,159  
attention to this. We got to pay  
more attention to this because

378  
00:26:59,159 --> 00:27:03,509  
this isn't something that is  
just a random occurrence. This

379  
00:27:03,509 --> 00:27:09,989  
is something that is almost like  
a, a tangible manifestation of

380  
00:27:09,989 --> 00:27:12,839  
something we don't understand.  
So let's get the working group

381  
00:27:12,839 --> 00:27:14,789  
together. And so

382  
00:27:14,790 --> 00:27:16,620  
John Greenwald: what year What  
year was this going on?

383  
00:27:18,390 --> 00:27:24,480

John Ramirez: The the best I can say is, if you look at

384

00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:29,670  
Wikipedia, and you can now search for k h 11. They give you

385

00:27:29,670 --> 00:27:33,120  
all the blocks, block one, block two, block three, block four,

386

00:27:33,120 --> 00:27:40,530  
block five, block two, in the early 90s was when the KH 11. A

387

00:27:40,560 --> 00:27:46,110  
optical sensor taking pictures also included an infrared

388

00:27:46,860 --> 00:27:53,610  
payload is the KH 11 is an electro optical sensor. I can

389

00:27:53,610 --> 00:27:57,000  
say that because in our roll reveal that, yeah, Nick 60th

390

00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,790  
anniversary brochure. So I'm saying I'm saying it's has

391

00:27:59,790 --> 00:28:04,890  
electro optical capabilities. So around, the best way I can tell

392

00:28:04,890 --> 00:28:10,110  
you without getting the trouble is, look, look at those blocks.

393

00:28:10,170 --> 00:28:14,220

And so the earliest would have been in the early 90s. But as

394

00:28:14,220 --> 00:28:19,950

these capabilities improved, when I first heard about this

395

00:28:19,980 --> 00:28:24,240

phenomenon occurring, it was more in the timeframe of when I

396

00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:29,700

became chief of Elan about 2003 2004. And the working group

397

00:28:30,510 --> 00:28:34,560

to that search, starting by 2004 2005. Gotcha.

398

00:28:35,670 --> 00:28:38,460

John Greenwald: So what's the next step once a working group

399

00:28:38,460 --> 00:28:43,080

convenes? And I assume but I want to clarify that the working

400

00:28:43,080 --> 00:28:48,090

group would be an eighth a official CIA Working Group.

401

00:28:49,079 --> 00:28:52,079

John Ramirez: No, it wasn't, it was an official nga working

402

00:28:52,079 --> 00:28:59,069

group. Okay. And GA was the source of the data and whoever

403

00:28:59,069 --> 00:29:02,369

has the source of the data.  
They're in charge of the working

404  
00:29:02,369 --> 00:29:05,879  
group. So it was NGA. I see.  
Okay, National Geospatial

405  
00:29:05,879 --> 00:29:09,569  
Intelligence Agency. They  
they're the ones who analyze,

406  
00:29:10,409 --> 00:29:14,189  
optical and electro optical  
imagery. I see. So it was their

407  
00:29:14,189 --> 00:29:19,169  
data. And so our tasking at the  
CIA side, we were weapons

408  
00:29:19,169 --> 00:29:21,719  
intelligence, Non Proliferation  
arms control the weapons

409  
00:29:21,719 --> 00:29:26,639  
intelligence part. The first  
thing we want to do is to rule

410  
00:29:26,639 --> 00:29:34,679  
out is it advanced technology  
from an adversary. And since we

411  
00:29:34,679 --> 00:29:39,419  
look at advanced technology from  
our adversaries, we can do that

412  
00:29:39,419 --> 00:29:43,109  
analysis. There are people  
looking at the actual craft that

413  
00:29:43,109 --> 00:29:48,689

could potentially be this and  
we're looking at the sensors or

414

00:29:48,689 --> 00:29:53,459  
packages like countermeasures,  
electronic countermeasures, that

415

00:29:53,459 --> 00:29:58,559  
could be providing this this  
kind of or like, manifestation.

416

00:29:59,249 --> 00:30:05,669  
And so What we looked at was US  
platforms in the Russian

417

00:30:05,669 --> 00:30:10,769  
inventory, that could have some  
kind of capability like that.

418

00:30:11,189 --> 00:30:16,139  
And plasma Stealth is that type  
of capability. Whereas we built

419

00:30:16,139 --> 00:30:20,519  
faceted, kind of shaped  
aircraft, like the F 117

420

00:30:20,519 --> 00:30:27,149  
Nighthawk. With facets and with  
radar absorbing materials, the

421

00:30:27,149 --> 00:30:31,649  
Russians went the opposite way  
they built devices that can be

422

00:30:31,649 --> 00:30:36,419  
hung on to some of their  
aircraft and produce a plasma

423

00:30:36,419 --> 00:30:40,379

field. So okay, that's, that's  
all comes razor. You know,

424

00:30:40,379 --> 00:30:44,819  
that's the simplest explanation.  
Uh huh. That's what it is. But

425

00:30:44,999 --> 00:30:48,299  
these orbs started appearing  
like way beyond the highest

426

00:30:48,299 --> 00:30:55,199  
flying Russian aircraft, which  
is the MC 31. It, it flew higher

427

00:30:55,199 --> 00:31:03,629  
than the FOXHOUND. And so  
123,000 feet is its maximum

428

00:31:03,659 --> 00:31:08,789  
ceiling, it did, like briefly,  
in a test, it usually flies

429

00:31:08,789 --> 00:31:14,609  
between like 85 to 100,000, in  
what we call wartime mode, they

430

00:31:14,609 --> 00:31:17,789  
don't fly that all the time. But  
if they need to, they can

431

00:31:17,789 --> 00:31:22,049  
sustain some flight because it's  
basically designed to shoot down

432

00:31:23,609 --> 00:31:30,539  
a LSR 71. It would look down,  
the radar is capable of looking

433

00:31:30,539 --> 00:31:33,629

down to missiles capable of firing down, we call it look

434

00:31:33,629 --> 00:31:37,649

down, shoot down. It had that capability for that purpose. And

435

00:31:37,649 --> 00:31:41,189

if you're wondering why we don't fly SRR 70 ones anymore? Why do

436

00:31:41,189 --> 00:31:45,209

we take them off the inventory. That's one of the reasons, as

437

00:31:45,209 --> 00:31:47,879

well as improvements in Soviet Air Defense, Russian air

438

00:31:47,879 --> 00:31:53,279

defenses. So we rule that out completely. And so other

439

00:31:53,279 --> 00:31:55,619

components of the intelligence community will bring their

440

00:31:55,619 --> 00:32:00,269

expertise to rule out their areas of expertise that they

441

00:32:00,269 --> 00:32:04,319

have knowledge of. And once that happens, subject matter experts,

442

00:32:04,319 --> 00:32:10,049

and each intelligence agency will be called together and meet

443

00:32:10,109 --> 00:32:15,029

to share information that they  
have gathered to rule out

444

00:32:15,059 --> 00:32:19,859  
everything. And then it was an  
opportunity for Nga, and in our

445

00:32:19,859 --> 00:32:24,239  
role, after they checked that it  
wasn't a software glitch. And it

446

00:32:24,239 --> 00:32:27,539  
wasn't a hardware glitch on the  
satellite. They brought their

447

00:32:27,539 --> 00:32:33,599  
expertise in. And at some point,  
in that working group, they were

448

00:32:34,109 --> 00:32:39,179  
informed about more of the  
history of the intelligence

449

00:32:39,179 --> 00:32:44,939  
community and US government's  
dealings with you followed me at

450

00:32:44,939 --> 00:32:51,059  
a very deep, classified level, I  
refuse to be briefed into that.

451

00:32:51,419 --> 00:32:54,989  
I didn't want to be briefed into  
that at all. I didn't need

452

00:32:55,169 --> 00:32:59,849  
actually to know that. But I  
didn't need for them to share

453

00:33:00,059 --> 00:33:02,399

why they wanted to have my  
engineers to go to this working

454

00:33:02,399 --> 00:33:06,779

group. And so my job was to  
write performance appraisal

455

00:33:06,779 --> 00:33:08,879

reports, I just need to know  
what they're doing. So I can

456

00:33:08,879 --> 00:33:11,789

evaluate what they're doing, and  
account for their time and pay

457

00:33:11,789 --> 00:33:12,629

for their trips.

458

00:33:14,010 --> 00:33:16,500

John Greenwald: So I've got  
like 12,000 questions is popped

459

00:33:16,500 --> 00:33:19,710

in here in the last 90 seconds  
of what you were saying. So let

460

00:33:19,710 --> 00:33:23,220

me first start with the  
involvement with the field of

461

00:33:23,310 --> 00:33:28,050

ufology. Is there any type of  
elaboration you can offer on

462

00:33:28,050 --> 00:33:30,000

that? I know, you said you  
weren't briefed. So I got that.

463

00:33:30,300 --> 00:33:33,090

But I mean, do you know what

they were referring to? Are you

464

00:33:33,090 --> 00:33:37,170  
talking about just They're,  
they're, in my opinion, not

465

00:33:37,170 --> 00:33:41,190  
really an investigative effort,  
but in essence, trying to skew

466

00:33:41,190 --> 00:33:44,460  
the storyline during the project  
Bluebook era? Are you are you

467

00:33:44,460 --> 00:33:47,850  
talking about that or something  
post Bluebook and something more

468

00:33:47,850 --> 00:33:48,510  
sinister,

469

00:33:49,230 --> 00:33:51,360  
John Ramirez: nothing sinister.  
But we're talking about the

470

00:33:51,360 --> 00:34:02,580  
actual technical exploitation of  
the UFO craft that flew during

471

00:34:02,580 --> 00:34:08,910  
the classic era 50 6070s During  
that project Bluebook time the

472

00:34:08,910 --> 00:34:12,300  
data that was collected that by  
the government, that's what

473

00:34:12,300 --> 00:34:15,270  
we're talking about, and they go  
okay, I believe they got briefed

474

00:34:15,270 --> 00:34:16,050  
into that

475

00:34:16,830 --> 00:34:20,670  
John Greenewald: data or  
physical objects slash crash

476

00:34:20,670 --> 00:34:23,580  
John Ramirez: as far as I know,  
data. I don't know if they saw

477

00:34:23,970 --> 00:34:27,300  
physical objects. I don't know  
if they saw anything about crash

478

00:34:27,300 --> 00:34:30,720  
retrievals metamaterials, I  
don't know because I didn't have

479

00:34:30,720 --> 00:34:32,250  
access to that kind of Meishan.

480

00:34:33,030 --> 00:34:35,220  
John Greenewald: Really quickly,  
why did you turn it down with

481

00:34:35,220 --> 00:34:39,000  
your, with your background and  
personal interest? Was there a

482

00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:40,590  
reason that you don't mind  
sharing?

483

00:34:41,250 --> 00:34:45,450  
John Ramirez: Well, basically,  
you know, this wasn't my day

484

00:34:45,450 --> 00:34:48,990  
job. My day job was much more  
involved than just sending two

485  
00:34:48,990 --> 00:34:54,210  
engineers to this. And the thing  
about CIA is that we don't hire

486  
00:34:54,210 --> 00:34:58,560  
people with curiosity. You know,  
I mean, if you're going to get a

487  
00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:01,020  
job at CIA because you're  
curious about UFOs, you want to

488  
00:35:01,020 --> 00:35:03,210  
get a job there? You're not  
going to get a job there. Yeah,

489  
00:35:03,240 --> 00:35:07,410  
we have just civic missions to  
do we have specific jobs to

490  
00:35:07,410 --> 00:35:12,480  
accomplish. And so that was my  
focus. And my plate was full

491  
00:35:12,480 --> 00:35:16,830  
with many, many other things,  
not to mention a budget. Gotcha.

492  
00:35:16,860 --> 00:35:21,330  
So, you know, my life was like,  
too much sheets. Gotcha. Excel

493  
00:35:21,330 --> 00:35:25,410  
spreadsheets was the was my job  
as a branch chief. That's all I

494

00:35:25,410 --> 00:35:29,850  
looked at, it seems like, and  
managing programs and leading

495  
00:35:29,850 --> 00:35:35,880  
people. The Career Service of  
these people was my

496  
00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:40,080  
responsibility, that I make sure  
that they're challenged, that

497  
00:35:40,110 --> 00:35:44,640  
they're trained, that they're  
accomplishing the mission that

498  
00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:50,400  
we need to accomplish. That was  
my focus. So just this is just

499  
00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:55,320  
being like an interest of mine.  
I knew what I needed to know, to

500  
00:35:55,320 --> 00:35:59,190  
do my job. And that's all I  
needed to know. Gotcha. But I

501  
00:35:59,190 --> 00:36:02,310  
would say this, when they came  
back, my two engineers came

502  
00:36:02,310 --> 00:36:07,560  
back. I used to have a little  
alien doll, a gray, except it

503  
00:36:07,560 --> 00:36:12,420  
was colored green. And it was  
like a stuffed stuffed all that

504

00:36:12,420 --> 00:36:17,070

I could bend and put it on my old 17 inch Dale CRT monitor.

505

00:36:17,100 --> 00:36:21,420

Yeah, yeah, top of the line at the top of the line, and that

506

00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:25,890

everyone knew I was interested in it. And UFOs and ETs, right.

507

00:36:26,370 --> 00:36:29,520

And so when they came back, they didn't say anything they sounded

508

00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:35,580

like not to my doll. And the basic set, you know, everything

509

00:36:35,580 --> 00:36:43,320

you think about. That all makes sense now. Wow. So okay, I don't

510

00:36:43,320 --> 00:36:46,020

need to know more. Yeah, they didn't tell me anymore. So

511

00:36:46,020 --> 00:36:49,860

that's the closest I got to knowing what they what they

512

00:36:49,860 --> 00:36:50,760

knew. But

513

00:36:51,480 --> 00:36:54,270

John Greenwald: so let me with with that being said, if that

514

00:36:54,270 --> 00:36:56,760

was the closest you got, let me take you back to the working

515

00:36:56,760 --> 00:36:59,970  
group. And it sounds like you guys worked really hard on

516

00:36:59,970 --> 00:37:03,540  
trying to figure out, you know, is there a Soviet explanation

517

00:37:03,540 --> 00:37:06,840  
for this, and essentially ruled a lot of that out? Are all of

518

00:37:06,840 --> 00:37:09,750  
that out? Was there a conclusion? I mean, what were

519

00:37:09,750 --> 00:37:12,600  
you guys leaning towards at that point, when the intelligence and

520

00:37:12,600 --> 00:37:16,320  
the data showed you? It was not the Soviets? It was not this MIG

521

00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:19,440  
it was not? Whatever you were looking at? What was the

522

00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:20,220  
working?

523

00:37:21,090 --> 00:37:24,000  
John Ramirez: Theory? Yeah, I would preface that with it was

524

00:37:24,030 --> 00:37:29,340  
during the Russian era, because

in the early 90s, the Soviet

525

00:37:29,340 --> 00:37:30,270

Union have,

526

00:37:30,780 --> 00:37:31,650

John Greenewald: gotcha, sorry,

527

00:37:31,680 --> 00:37:34,770

John Ramirez: I was rushing back  
a little too far. Um, but I

528

00:37:34,770 --> 00:37:35,400

wasn't privy

529

00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:36,720

John Greenewald: to Tech was  
probably the same. It's

530

00:37:36,720 --> 00:37:39,420

John Ramirez: fine. Yeah, I  
wasn't privy to any of the

531

00:37:39,420 --> 00:37:43,800

results of what the working  
group did. I did not know, I

532

00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:47,130

just know, there was a working  
group, it dealt with this

533

00:37:47,130 --> 00:37:54,120

unusual orb anomaly. I knew that  
it was in the 600 nanometre

534

00:37:54,120 --> 00:37:57,600

range, which is orange, which  
kind of fits what people see

535

00:37:57,780 --> 00:38:04,710  
themselves now, I witnesses,  
orange orbs, that they were not

536  
00:38:04,710 --> 00:38:10,440  
just random specks. But they  
were flying in some kind of

537  
00:38:10,440 --> 00:38:14,280  
grouping. I say formation, but  
when I say formation, people

538  
00:38:14,280 --> 00:38:17,460  
think of a you know V shape or  
something like that. It was just

539  
00:38:17,460 --> 00:38:25,590  
flying together. Okay. At a very  
fast rate coming over the the

540  
00:38:25,620 --> 00:38:31,680  
Arctic Circle region, over the  
Russian landmass with intent to

541  
00:38:31,680 --> 00:38:34,530  
go somewhere, you know, it's not  
like there's a scattering

542  
00:38:34,530 --> 00:38:39,240  
everywhere. There's a whole  
group flying together as a

543  
00:38:39,240 --> 00:38:41,070  
group. And so that's, that's  
what I knew.

544  
00:38:41,280 --> 00:38:43,830  
John Greenewald: So you. Okay,  
so you found out about all of

545

00:38:43,830 --> 00:38:47,550  
that, but you but never know,  
whomever shared with you this

546  
00:38:47,550 --> 00:38:53,610  
information? Never said, John,  
this is what we think it is, or

547  
00:38:53,640 --> 00:38:55,140  
no, no, no,

548  
00:38:55,170 --> 00:38:57,660  
John Ramirez: that was a  
compartment, they were read into

549  
00:38:57,660 --> 00:39:00,390  
a compartment that was created  
for that purpose for the working

550  
00:39:00,390 --> 00:39:01,110  
group purpose,

551  
00:39:01,350 --> 00:39:04,410  
John Greenwald: from what you  
did learn and your experience,

552  
00:39:04,590 --> 00:39:09,420  
extensive experience with all of  
this through 25 years. Looking

553  
00:39:09,420 --> 00:39:13,050  
back, what do you feel and I  
know it's an opinion and you're

554  
00:39:13,050 --> 00:39:16,260  
not sharing classified info  
here. But if I were to just ask

555  
00:39:16,260 --> 00:39:19,950  
you based on your personal

opinion and your intelligence on

556

00:39:19,950 --> 00:39:21,540  
the matter, what would you say?

557

00:39:22,290 --> 00:39:25,320  
John Ramirez: Well, I, I believe  
that these orbs are some

558

00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:29,610  
manifestations of the phenomenon  
that is not metallic craft, it

559

00:39:29,610 --> 00:39:38,760  
could be okay, so for with my  
interest in more of the esoteric

560

00:39:41,310 --> 00:39:45,810  
features, if you follow g that  
is more like what we call the

561

00:39:45,810 --> 00:39:49,560  
metaphysical side of your  
apology. I believe that they're

562

00:39:49,590 --> 00:39:55,140  
like, manifestations of higher  
consciousness, that they're not

563

00:39:55,140 --> 00:40:00,930  
like craft. They're not like,  
like Tic Tac or Kimble are go

564

00:40:00,930 --> 00:40:05,730  
fast. But they're like  
manifestations of some other fun

565

00:40:05,760 --> 00:40:09,870  
parts of the phenomenon that we  
don't quite fully understand.

566

00:40:10,620 --> 00:40:13,470

But when you talk to  
experiencers, they fully

567

00:40:13,470 --> 00:40:16,440

understand it. If you talk to  
people who have seen these orbs,

568

00:40:17,520 --> 00:40:19,800

they fully understand what  
they're looking at that there's

569

00:40:19,800 --> 00:40:25,020

some consciousness behind what  
they're seeing. To the point,

570

00:40:25,020 --> 00:40:31,740

when I saw my orb in 2020, I got  
a message from it, to do what

571

00:40:31,740 --> 00:40:34,380

I'm doing right now that you  
have information The world needs

572

00:40:34,380 --> 00:40:38,730

to know. You need to share this  
information. You need to work

573

00:40:38,730 --> 00:40:43,560

with someone who's looking to,  
to have answers to their

574

00:40:43,560 --> 00:40:47,460

questions, and I found that  
person. So that's my

575

00:40:47,460 --> 00:40:49,050

interpretation. Who

576

00:40:49,170 --> 00:40:51,630

John Greenwald: can ask who is that? No, I can't I can't help

577

00:40:51,630 --> 00:40:54,420

you. Under understood, I wasn't sure if there was a maybe a

578

00:40:54,420 --> 00:40:58,350

public program project that you were doing that you can No, but

579

00:40:58,350 --> 00:41:01,230

no problem is private. Sorry. Yeah. I didn't mean to I didn't

580

00:41:01,230 --> 00:41:06,090

mean to pry too much there. But so so your experience, obviously

581

00:41:06,090 --> 00:41:11,940

was kind of reminiscent to what the k 11 And the NGA data that

582

00:41:11,940 --> 00:41:14,850

was being shared with the CIA and that working group? Do you

583

00:41:14,850 --> 00:41:17,550

feel it was the same phenomena phenomenon?

584

00:41:17,760 --> 00:41:21,720

John Ramirez: Well, the orb phenomenon was more of the

585

00:41:21,720 --> 00:41:28,560

electro optical variety IR previously, that the Soviet

586

00:41:28,560 --> 00:41:33,930

Union, during the Soviet era,  
with their radar systems did

587

00:41:33,930 --> 00:41:41,790

detect unusual events in the  
sky. And we call those the domes

588

00:41:41,790 --> 00:41:47,430

of light. So that's another type  
of a light kind of manifestation

589

00:41:47,430 --> 00:41:52,740

of the phenomenon. And I first  
heard about the domes like not

590

00:41:52,740 --> 00:41:57,120

through any kind of intelligence  
source, but a quasi intelligence

591

00:41:57,120 --> 00:42:00,300

source, the Aviation Week  
journal, which we used to call

592

00:42:00,300 --> 00:42:04,650

aviation leak yet, because  
there's so much good information

593

00:42:04,650 --> 00:42:09,210

in there that we actually  
circulated around the office for

594

00:42:09,240 --> 00:42:13,440

and we put a routing slip on it  
to make sure we check our names

595

00:42:13,440 --> 00:42:16,290

off because there was so much  
information there, that actually

596

00:42:16,290 --> 00:42:21,240

triggered a lot of professional investigations into what they

597

00:42:21,240 --> 00:42:24,720

were reporting. And one of them was the domes of light, which

598

00:42:24,750 --> 00:42:31,980

FTD knew about. And then they, the FTD wanted to cast this as a

599

00:42:31,980 --> 00:42:37,650

type of Soviet ballistic missile countermeasures that they were

600

00:42:37,650 --> 00:42:43,920

seeing. But these domes of light occurred absent of any missile

601

00:42:43,920 --> 00:42:49,530

test. And the missile that was most prevalent with these drones

602

00:42:49,530 --> 00:42:56,370

alive was the SS 20 Sable, which was an intercontinental no

603

00:42:56,370 --> 00:43:00,600

intermediate range ballistic missile IRBM, which was

604

00:43:00,600 --> 00:43:04,620

politically destabilizing and militarily destabilizing during

605

00:43:04,620 --> 00:43:10,170

the day because they would like station DS, SS 20s, close to

606

00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:14,880

NATO. And that was its purpose.  
The target was NATO. And that

607

00:43:14,880 --> 00:43:20,700

prompted us to then deploy the  
Pershing to IRBM. So you have

608

00:43:20,730 --> 00:43:24,750

nuclear missiles that can land  
on targets within minutes,

609

00:43:24,780 --> 00:43:27,960

because they're so close. And  
that was highly politically

610

00:43:27,990 --> 00:43:32,850

destabilizing. And so the  
phenomenon probably my opinion

611

00:43:32,850 --> 00:43:36,600

is the phenomenon knowing that  
we know now that that they're

612

00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:40,110

associated with like ballistic  
missiles, nuclear type ballistic

613

00:43:40,110 --> 00:43:43,170

missiles, phenomenon had an  
interest in the testing of the

614

00:43:43,170 --> 00:43:47,070

SS 20. And so when they launch  
SS 20, this phenomenon will

615

00:43:47,070 --> 00:43:51,960

occur, which was interpreted by  
FTD in the most mundane way.

616

00:43:52,140 --> 00:43:54,300

It's just ballistic missile countermeasures. But how do you

617

00:43:54,480 --> 00:43:59,700

describe this phenomenon being seen by people on the ground,

618

00:43:59,940 --> 00:44:02,850

we're not associated with a Soviet military. There's just

619

00:44:02,850 --> 00:44:07,080

eyewitnesses, citizens on the ground seeing this. So it's not

620

00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:11,760

like totally related to ballistic missile testing. And

621

00:44:11,760 --> 00:44:16,890

that was detected by radars by the Russian radar, the Soviet

622

00:44:16,890 --> 00:44:22,590

radars at the time. So in that sense, my very first encounter

623

00:44:22,590 --> 00:44:25,860

with anything of high strangeness was not these this

624

00:44:25,890 --> 00:44:29,700

or working group, but this phenomenon known as the domes of

625

00:44:29,700 --> 00:44:35,340

light, where we actually deployed sensors to look for

626

00:44:35,370 --> 00:44:41,250

these unusual types of anomalous lights. And where we deployed

627

00:44:41,250 --> 00:44:47,070

that sensor was on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Because we

628

00:44:47,070 --> 00:44:51,510

wanted to get a good look at as the missiles were flying their

629

00:44:51,510 --> 00:44:56,280

trajectories, and re entering the warheads were reenter. We

630

00:44:56,280 --> 00:44:59,370

want to be able to detect if there any of these stones are

631

00:44:59,370 --> 00:44:59,760

like

632

00:45:01,260 --> 00:45:03,150

John Greenwald: Let me ask you a hypothetical question. And

633

00:45:03,150 --> 00:45:08,490

this is more towards the orb working group versus the domes

634

00:45:08,490 --> 00:45:11,850

of light. But let's, let's say and I know you don't know the

635

00:45:11,850 --> 00:45:14,940

conclusion, but that but they were leading to some kind of

636

00:45:14,940 --> 00:45:20,550  
manifestation of a phenomenon of  
some kind. That was not related

637  
00:45:20,550 --> 00:45:22,680  
to a missile launcher  
countermeasures or anything like

638  
00:45:22,680 --> 00:45:26,670  
that. Is that something that  
either the NGA would take the

639  
00:45:26,670 --> 00:45:31,440  
next step and trying to figure  
out, or in my opinion, for many,

640  
00:45:31,440 --> 00:45:35,160  
many years, and arguably  
decades, some of these

641  
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:38,220  
intelligence agencies just kind  
of turned a blind eye to the

642  
00:45:38,520 --> 00:45:43,080  
more nuts and bolts UFO  
phenomenon. With this, do you

643  
00:45:43,080 --> 00:45:45,690  
think the CIA would have said,  
Hey, we need to figure this out,

644  
00:45:45,690 --> 00:45:49,200  
we as the CIA, or with the NGA  
do that? Or do you think that

645  
00:45:49,200 --> 00:45:53,490  
they would just say, You know  
what, we're gonna leave this

646

00:45:53,580 --> 00:45:56,850  
well enough alone, like, Who do  
you think would be taking the

647

00:45:56,850 --> 00:45:59,910  
lead on trying to then take the  
next step to understand it?

648

00:46:00,270 --> 00:46:02,490  
John Ramirez: Well, so working  
group, the product of the

649

00:46:02,490 --> 00:46:08,070  
working group will be a report  
of their best estimate,

650

00:46:08,340 --> 00:46:13,800  
assessment or judgment of what  
we detected. And that report

651

00:46:13,800 --> 00:46:19,050  
will go to the Director of  
National Intelligence. And the

652

00:46:19,050 --> 00:46:21,540  
director of national  
intelligence can then brief the

653

00:46:21,540 --> 00:46:27,750  
policymaker. That is the  
president united states and the

654

00:46:29,340 --> 00:46:35,010  
appointed policymakers like the  
Secretary of Defense. And once

655

00:46:35,010 --> 00:46:39,240  
that report is written, the  
title 50 side and for your

656

00:46:39,240 --> 00:46:44,430  
audience, the title 50 is the  
non DoD side of the intelligence

657  
00:46:44,430 --> 00:46:48,750  
community. So it's basically  
CIA, and actually parts of the

658  
00:46:48,750 --> 00:46:58,890  
NSA, which are non military.  
That they would then just

659  
00:46:59,370 --> 00:47:02,670  
produce the working group  
produce the report from a title

660  
00:47:02,670 --> 00:47:06,360  
50 perspective of the civilian  
side of all of these

661  
00:47:06,360 --> 00:47:10,440  
intelligence agencies. And  
there's the report. Now, the

662  
00:47:10,440 --> 00:47:14,220  
Secretary of Defense, being  
briefed on this, maybe Usdi

663  
00:47:14,610 --> 00:47:18,960  
being briefed on this. It's up  
to them to decide you know what

664  
00:47:18,960 --> 00:47:24,540  
to do. And they may then take  
the DoD perspective on just

665  
00:47:24,540 --> 00:47:28,050  
about everything like that it's  
a threat, or could it be a

666

00:47:28,050 --> 00:47:32,100  
threat? And if it is a threat,  
or could be a threat? First of

667  
00:47:32,100 --> 00:47:37,200  
all, how do we protect our own  
forces? What is the nature of

668  
00:47:37,200 --> 00:47:40,110  
this threat? What are  
vulnerabilities versus this

669  
00:47:40,110 --> 00:47:43,800  
threat? And how do we do force  
protection? So that's their

670  
00:47:43,800 --> 00:47:51,420  
focus, and incomes all set? So  
2004 2005, when I left for NCPC,

671  
00:47:51,450 --> 00:47:56,130  
and return to 2009, that working  
group was done. My understanding

672  
00:47:56,130 --> 00:48:00,330  
was it was done like 2007, there  
abouts. It was a short lived

673  
00:48:00,330 --> 00:48:03,690  
working group. It wasn't like  
something that lasted years and

674  
00:48:03,690 --> 00:48:05,280  
years and years. Are you

675  
00:48:05,280 --> 00:48:09,840  
John Greenwald: aware of that  
report? That they potentially I

676  
00:48:09,840 --> 00:48:11,940

know that that's a standard procedure that you're going

677

00:48:11,940 --> 00:48:15,210

over? But in direct relation to that or working group? Are you

678

00:48:15,210 --> 00:48:17,040

familiar that they created a report?

679

00:48:17,670 --> 00:48:20,880

John Ramirez: I can say that a report was a product of the

680

00:48:20,880 --> 00:48:25,770

working group? So the Rams so they there was a report? I don't

681

00:48:25,770 --> 00:48:26,550

say that. So

682

00:48:26,550 --> 00:48:29,160

John Greenwald: classified? Is this a classified? Absolutely.

683

00:48:29,160 --> 00:48:29,250

It's

684

00:48:29,250 --> 00:48:31,350

John Ramirez: going to be classified? Because in that

685

00:48:31,350 --> 00:48:35,070

report that we use sources, the methods, they were used exactly

686

00:48:35,550 --> 00:48:37,860

what the sensors were able to detect

687

00:48:38,250 --> 00:48:39,930

John Greenwald: classified elements. I'm talking about the

688

00:48:39,930 --> 00:48:42,930

project or program or excuse me, working group, I want to make

689

00:48:42,930 --> 00:48:45,150

sure I'm accurate here. But the working group as a whole, was it

690

00:48:45,150 --> 00:48:47,940

a classified effort as a whole? Absolutely. It

691

00:48:47,940 --> 00:48:51,900

John Ramirez: was a top secret SCI working group with a

692

00:48:51,930 --> 00:48:54,120

compartment designed for that working group.

693

00:48:55,200 --> 00:48:58,500

John Greenwald: And all that makes sense. Can I ask just as

694

00:48:58,500 --> 00:49:02,100

myself being a layman? And not entirely sure about all of every

695

00:49:02,100 --> 00:49:06,810

facet of the classified world? How is it that you're able to

696

00:49:06,840 --> 00:49:10,440

talk about I know, you didn't give conclusions, and you didn't

697

00:49:10,440 --> 00:49:12,750

talk about technical  
capabilities of you know, top

698

00:49:12,750 --> 00:49:16,620

secret tech. But if the idea of  
the if the working group itself

699

00:49:16,620 --> 00:49:22,200

was a top secret sci fi  
environment helped me understand

700

00:49:22,200 --> 00:49:23,280

how can we talk about it?

701

00:49:23,580 --> 00:49:26,820

John Ramirez: Well, John, their  
their levels of understanding

702

00:49:27,330 --> 00:49:31,710

and the first level of  
understanding is called fact of

703

00:49:32,490 --> 00:49:38,790

fact of that something occurred.  
So the fact of is not sensitive.

704

00:49:39,090 --> 00:49:43,980

Now, I mean, I learned of this  
way back when, and I sat on it

705

00:49:44,010 --> 00:49:50,280

until, like, this year. You  
know, when I started doing these

706

00:49:50,280 --> 00:49:54,510

podcasts, and I put it together  
in a report for CIA's review,

707

00:49:55,500 --> 00:49:59,040

that you know, working group  
happened and this is what might

708

00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:04,680

have happened And I couched it  
in terms that could be a

709

00:50:04,680 --> 00:50:07,770

hypothetical, but CIA knew that  
this working group occurred.

710

00:50:08,339 --> 00:50:11,609

John Greenwald: And they just  
to clarify, because I've talked

711

00:50:11,609 --> 00:50:14,399

about the DoD side on this  
channel before, so my audience

712

00:50:14,399 --> 00:50:16,919

has seen a lot of the videos,  
that would be the Doppler

713

00:50:16,919 --> 00:50:20,909

process, the DD Form 1910, so on  
and so forth, that ties into the

714

00:50:21,389 --> 00:50:25,619

UAP videos. So CIA, I assume,  
would just have the same similar

715

00:50:25,619 --> 00:50:30,599

process where you take what you  
are going to either publish talk

716

00:50:30,599 --> 00:50:36,809

about verbally orally in a in a,  
like a conference or lecture,

717

00:50:36,869 --> 00:50:40,319

and they approve what you can  
come out with is that that's

718

00:50:40,319 --> 00:50:43,529

correct. Okay. So and they gave  
you approval to talk about this,

719

00:50:43,560 --> 00:50:46,290

John Ramirez: right, the pre  
publication classification

720

00:50:46,290 --> 00:50:51,810

review board, stated that my  
presentation was unclassified

721

00:50:51,840 --> 00:50:59,010

and can be publicly disseminated  
everything in it. And that they

722

00:50:59,010 --> 00:51:03,150

do not that the fact that they  
consider it unclassified, they

723

00:51:03,150 --> 00:51:08,430

do not say that they can endorse  
sure everything in it, whether

724

00:51:08,430 --> 00:51:13,290

it be factual, or not factual.  
So it's there, they're out the

725

00:51:13,290 --> 00:51:17,880

way the way they can like  
distance itself themselves. From

726

00:51:17,910 --> 00:51:21,840

anything we CIA officers might  
produce, even if it's factual,

727

00:51:22,530 --> 00:51:26,160  
they will always say, well, we  
can't stay say officially, that

728

00:51:26,160 --> 00:51:30,690  
is factual. So that was the  
situation that I follow. This is

729

00:51:30,690 --> 00:51:34,080  
the front door situation, I just  
want to let everyone know, I am

730

00:51:34,080 --> 00:51:38,130  
not a whistleblower. I went  
through the front door, and I

731

00:51:38,130 --> 00:51:40,800  
will always go to the front  
door, because that's what I

732

00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:45,570  
signed up to do when I left CIA  
to protect sources and methods

733

00:51:45,600 --> 00:51:50,070  
over a lifetime. And then, so  
that was the process I followed,

734

00:51:50,070 --> 00:51:54,480  
which allows me to be speaking  
with you. And I let CIA know

735

00:51:54,480 --> 00:51:57,690  
that if there's anything I say,  
and, you know, they're

736

00:51:57,690 --> 00:52:00,960  
monitoring all of my  
appearances, they monitor Jim,

737

00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:04,650  
semi events, appearances on  
Coast coasts, or any any

738

00:52:04,680 --> 00:52:07,710  
appearances by former  
intelligence community officers

739

00:52:08,010 --> 00:52:11,580  
are home offices, believe me,  
they're monitoring what you say.

740

00:52:11,970 --> 00:52:15,270  
And they know it, because I told  
them if there's anything I do,

741

00:52:15,480 --> 00:52:22,470  
or say, that crosses a line, let  
me know. And I will stop. And so

742

00:52:22,470 --> 00:52:27,180  
far, I've received no feedback  
about stop.

743

00:52:29,130 --> 00:52:31,740  
John Greenwald: If you could  
sum up what your intention is by

744

00:52:31,740 --> 00:52:35,100  
doing these types of shows and  
bringing this information

745

00:52:35,100 --> 00:52:38,580  
forward. In summary, what are  
you wanting to accomplish?

746

00:52:39,660 --> 00:52:42,330  
John Ramirez: I want to  
accomplish that what we all

747

00:52:42,330 --> 00:52:46,620

know, as you follow just what  
you know, it is that the

748

00:52:46,620 --> 00:52:51,780

government, even project  
Bluebook was a limited program

749

00:52:51,960 --> 00:52:58,080

of gathering information from  
citizens gathering information

750

00:52:58,080 --> 00:53:02,550

from citizens maybe to debunk or  
maybe to collect these other

751

00:53:02,550 --> 00:53:08,010

incidents in their database. But  
there was an ongoing process

752

00:53:08,280 --> 00:53:14,010

since Roswell, to try to  
understand what we're seeing

753

00:53:14,340 --> 00:53:19,320

what we have collected, that  
process never stopped. And this

754

00:53:19,320 --> 00:53:24,810

orb working group was just a  
latest part of that long,

755

00:53:24,840 --> 00:53:30,390

ongoing process to where we're  
not seeing metallic craft. Now

756

00:53:30,420 --> 00:53:34,830

we're seeing these entities of  
light appearing over the earth.

757

00:53:36,450 --> 00:53:42,000

And so I want people know that  
what your knowing what you known

758

00:53:42,000 --> 00:53:48,480

as all SAP and Atef. That wasn't  
when it started. We informed I

759

00:53:48,480 --> 00:53:52,080

believe we informed the people  
who did all sap in ative, they

760

00:53:52,080 --> 00:53:56,280

must have known about this  
working group, because they were

761

00:53:56,310 --> 00:53:59,880

there were Defense Intelligence  
people associated with that

762

00:53:59,880 --> 00:54:02,340

working group. Looking at orbs,

763

00:54:02,699 --> 00:54:05,849

John Greenewald: so it and  
that's an interesting line

764

00:54:05,879 --> 00:54:09,089

chronologically, you're talking  
about it sounds like a few years

765

00:54:09,089 --> 00:54:12,659

roughly, you know the the  
concept of SAP depending upon

766

00:54:12,659 --> 00:54:16,559

who you believe, was kind of  
born in 2007. Officially, it was

767

00:54:16,589 --> 00:54:20,339  
you know, towards the end of  
2008 when it was contracted out.

768  
00:54:20,579 --> 00:54:24,719  
So you feel that that's there's  
a direct line there between or

769  
00:54:24,719 --> 00:54:28,169  
maybe not direct, but there's a  
line or connection between the

770  
00:54:28,169 --> 00:54:32,039  
work of a or working group like  
this, the discovery of that

771  
00:54:32,549 --> 00:54:38,849  
phenomenon, and then the OSS AP  
contract coming up and the DIA

772  
00:54:38,849 --> 00:54:41,729  
is focus, you feel that there's  
some kind of line there.

773  
00:54:41,760 --> 00:54:44,670  
John Ramirez: There's a lineage,  
there's a lineage, it's not a

774  
00:54:44,670 --> 00:54:49,500  
direct lineage, but when title  
50 got done, title 10 took it

775  
00:54:49,500 --> 00:54:53,790  
up. Title 10 being the  
Department of Defense, and so

776  
00:54:53,820 --> 00:54:58,140  
many of the same people who are  
in the DIA and under Title 50

777

00:54:58,800 --> 00:55:05,160  
under NSA In a row, they're also  
kind of under mostly under title

778

00:55:05,190 --> 00:55:10,560  
title 10. They answer to the  
Secretary of Defense. They nod

779

00:55:10,620 --> 00:55:15,480  
to the DNI. We answered the DNI  
were title 50. And people need

780

00:55:15,480 --> 00:55:18,450  
to realize that the Intelligence  
Committee isn't this big

781

00:55:18,450 --> 00:55:26,010  
monolith. There are different US  
Code laws that met that regulate

782

00:55:26,010 --> 00:55:29,610  
what we can do. We have to  
follow these laws. We follow

783

00:55:29,610 --> 00:55:34,590  
title 50, DOD falls, title 10.  
And so Lew said this himself,

784

00:55:34,590 --> 00:55:38,880  
this was a title 10 effort. He  
always mentions this is a title

785

00:55:38,880 --> 00:55:44,010  
10 effort, because he knows that  
there was a title 50 effort. And

786

00:55:44,010 --> 00:55:47,730  
so he just doesn't say, We're  
just DOD, the department is

787

00:55:47,730 --> 00:55:54,060

this. He says, this is a title  
10 investigation into what we

788

00:55:54,060 --> 00:55:59,340

saw, and they went into even  
more high strangeness with SIM

789

00:55:59,340 --> 00:55:59,790

Walker.

790

00:55:59,940 --> 00:56:02,310

John Greenwald: Exactly. And  
that that leads me to my next

791

00:56:02,310 --> 00:56:05,160

question, because I've always  
been skeptical over what the

792

00:56:05,160 --> 00:56:12,870

official dia desire for OS app  
was versus what contractor may

793

00:56:12,900 --> 00:56:18,000

have turned it into, or was he  
just he meaning Bigelow, Robert

794

00:56:18,000 --> 00:56:20,730

Bigelow, but through Bigelow  
Aerospace, when he was awarded

795

00:56:20,730 --> 00:56:25,290

this doing exactly what the DIA  
wanted, or was it skewed a bit

796

00:56:25,320 --> 00:56:29,280

and ended up backfiring, hence  
why it was defunded, a couple

797

00:56:29,280 --> 00:56:32,070

years later. I've always  
struggled with that, because

798

00:56:32,190 --> 00:56:37,350  
dia, as you mentioned, is the  
military side of this, they're

799

00:56:37,590 --> 00:56:42,660  
getting into, according to the  
story, the paranormal and

800

00:56:42,660 --> 00:56:46,710  
looking at Skinwalker Ranch and  
orbs go along with a long list

801

00:56:46,710 --> 00:56:50,310  
of other stuff, including, you  
know, weird creatures that they

802

00:56:50,310 --> 00:56:54,630  
were investigating and so on.  
That also was in skinwalkers, in

803

00:56:54,630 --> 00:56:57,690  
the Pentagon, and this is where  
my skepticism comes out. So

804

00:56:57,690 --> 00:57:03,180  
maybe you can help me out here  
understand, why would that be in

805

00:57:03,180 --> 00:57:07,620  
the purview of the DIA, I can  
see a couple other agencies, if

806

00:57:07,620 --> 00:57:10,290  
you took the DIA out and put,  
you know, a couple other

807

00:57:10,290 --> 00:57:14,040

different agencies in okay, then  
we could we can chat about that.

808

00:57:14,340 --> 00:57:18,990

But I don't see dia So from your  
experience and expertise from

809

00:57:18,990 --> 00:57:21,420

the IC side. Why dia?

810

00:57:22,290 --> 00:57:26,910

John Ramirez: Why DIA is because  
the director of DIA is the

811

00:57:26,910 --> 00:57:30,330

functional Mission Manager for  
an intelligence defense

812

00:57:30,570 --> 00:57:34,620

discipline known as Masson  
measurement and signature

813

00:57:34,650 --> 00:57:38,760

intelligence. Sometimes people  
say signals intelligence, that's

814

00:57:38,760 --> 00:57:42,570

not correct. It's meant a  
measurement and signature

815

00:57:42,600 --> 00:57:47,250

intelligence. So they would  
deploy sensors that can collect

816

00:57:48,990 --> 00:57:53,760

this type this type of  
phenomenon. They would collect

817

00:57:54,060 --> 00:57:59,910

radio metric data, radiological

data, infrared data, ultraviolet

818

00:57:59,910 --> 00:58:03,750

data, they will look at this phenomenon with the sensor

819

00:58:03,750 --> 00:58:07,260

capabilities that they can deploy. That doesn't just

820

00:58:07,260 --> 00:58:14,670

collect signals like NSA, or in CIA, there's really no human

821

00:58:14,970 --> 00:58:19,830

involved because there's no one to recruit as an as an agent to

822

00:58:19,830 --> 00:58:22,860

work for us. We're not going to recruit the phenomenon, hey, why

823

00:58:22,860 --> 00:58:25,860

don't you work for us and tell us what you're doing so this

824

00:58:25,860 --> 00:58:28,380

that those parts of the intelligence community would not

825

00:58:28,380 --> 00:58:34,950

come into play. But that DIA is responsible for Masset. There is

826

00:58:34,980 --> 00:58:40,710

a part of the DIA called Dia slash Delta Tango dt, and that

827

00:58:40,710 --> 00:58:44,850

is the mass and office at DIA.

And so they have there's

828

00:58:44,850 --> 00:58:48,750  
complete responsibility for  
Masset. And since this

829

00:58:48,780 --> 00:58:54,840  
phenomenon, is something that  
requires collection, beyond our

830

00:58:55,800 --> 00:59:03,960  
senses, beyond our other types  
of capabilities and signals, our

831

00:59:03,960 --> 00:59:07,740  
human or open source, dia will  
come into play and that's why

832

00:59:07,740 --> 00:59:08,400  
they're there.

833

00:59:09,719 --> 00:59:10,919  
John Greenwald: But on US soil,

834

00:59:10,949 --> 00:59:13,649  
John Ramirez: they do that  
because Department of Defense.

835

00:59:14,699 --> 00:59:18,059  
They're responsible for the  
national security of the United

836

00:59:18,059 --> 00:59:25,499  
States of America, in that very  
tangible form. So dia, as

837

00:59:25,529 --> 00:59:33,149  
Department of Defense title 10  
can operate on US soil for the

838

00:59:33,149 --> 00:59:37,529

intelligence mission, they can  
deploy. In that sense, CIA

839

00:59:37,529 --> 00:59:43,649

cannot deploy to collect  
intelligence on US soil. Now, if

840

00:59:43,649 --> 00:59:47,669

this phenomenon occurred in  
Russia, or China or some other

841

00:59:47,789 --> 00:59:50,429

foreign place, that's when CIA

842

00:59:50,429 --> 00:59:56,639

John Greenwald: CIA could,  
yeah. Gotcha. Okay. And some of

843

00:59:56,639 --> 00:59:58,829

this controversy, you know, just  
want to get your input and then

844

00:59:58,829 --> 01:00:02,849

we could move on some The  
controversy about this is what

845

01:00:02,849 --> 01:00:10,439

the public OS app objective list  
was, and that without was public

846

01:00:10,439 --> 01:00:15,839

for many years, just even prior  
to December 2017, even though we

847

01:00:15,839 --> 01:00:19,469

never knew about OS app until  
the next year, but that was

848

01:00:19,469 --> 01:00:24,119  
public for quite some time. Zero  
mention about any of that. If

849

01:00:24,209 --> 01:00:27,149  
you worked in the top secret  
world, if they wanted a

850

01:00:27,149 --> 01:00:29,549  
paranormal research study that  
they would keep highly

851

01:00:29,549 --> 01:00:33,269  
classified. Why would they post  
anything in public? Why wouldn't

852

01:00:33,269 --> 01:00:39,269  
they either do it themselves or  
contract in secret? It is, do

853

01:00:39,269 --> 01:00:41,759  
you have thoughts on on that,  
because I've always been curious

854

01:00:41,759 --> 01:00:45,449  
about what was publicly  
available versus what we've been

855

01:00:45,449 --> 01:00:47,099  
told the program really was?

856

01:00:47,880 --> 01:00:55,830  
John Ramirez: Well, first of  
all, when they hired bass, that

857

01:00:55,830 --> 01:01:02,550  
had to be a detail known to the  
public through the RFP process.

858

01:01:03,600 --> 01:01:07,410

You can't just pick a company  
said work for us, they had to go

859

01:01:07,860 --> 01:01:11,550

and follow the federal  
acquisition regulations on how

860

01:01:11,550 --> 01:01:18,330

to hire an external contractor.

And they did that. So in the

861

01:01:18,330 --> 01:01:25,290

Federal Register, you have to  
announce the fact that there is

862

01:01:25,290 --> 01:01:30,210

a contract, and you have to  
publish the request for proposal

863

01:01:30,240 --> 01:01:36,270

in the public domain. So the  
requirements for such a

864

01:01:36,270 --> 01:01:44,520

capability for this contract,  
and the requirements for the

865

01:01:44,520 --> 01:01:49,710

mission and what it needs to  
accomplish. It would have to be

866

01:01:49,710 --> 01:01:53,100

publicly known, because how else  
can a company then leverage its

867

01:01:53,100 --> 01:01:58,650

resources and its capabilities?  
How can they do that? Unless

868

01:01:58,650 --> 01:02:00,150

they know what the government wants? So they

869

01:02:00,150 --> 01:02:02,190

John Greenwald: are claiming but well, there's classified

870

01:02:02,520 --> 01:02:06,630

contracts that are awarded to and you don't? And again, I'm

871

01:02:06,630 --> 01:02:09,720

more asking, not telling you. But But asking, you know, when

872

01:02:09,720 --> 01:02:13,170

you have a contract, like for a stealth drone, or something like

873

01:02:13,170 --> 01:02:17,460

that, that in correct me if I'm wrong, they don't put a an RFP

874

01:02:17,460 --> 01:02:22,470

out for that type of level of secrecy with the technology they

875

01:02:22,470 --> 01:02:24,240

want to create? Or do they?

876

01:02:24,990 --> 01:02:28,320

John Ramirez: Well, when, okay, so when, like preamps, or when

877

01:02:28,320 --> 01:02:35,520

the when the F 117 was being developed. That would be just as

878

01:02:35,520 --> 01:02:43,590

part of another effort to

advance. Aviation, military

879

01:02:43,590 --> 01:02:44,640

aviation, right.

880

01:02:44,670 --> 01:02:47,250

John Greenwald: But Kevin C, in secret is where I'm going. That

881

01:02:47,250 --> 01:02:47,520

is,

882

01:02:48,420 --> 01:02:50,130

John Ramirez: well, once the program starts, it will be

883

01:02:50,130 --> 01:03:00,720

classified. But we don't announce all the details, the

884

01:03:00,720 --> 01:03:04,890

secret details of a program, we announced just enough to get to

885

01:03:04,890 --> 01:03:08,940

be able to do the market survey, and to do the technical

886

01:03:08,940 --> 01:03:12,600

evaluation of the responses coming back from these

887

01:03:12,600 --> 01:03:20,040

companies. And they can be classified. But the actual

888

01:03:20,040 --> 01:03:24,120

reading of the contract the the RFP process is not but to your

889

01:03:24,120 --> 01:03:29,550

point. Yeah, once once the RFPs  
come back, they can be

890

01:03:29,550 --> 01:03:30,210

classified,

891

01:03:30,870 --> 01:03:34,290

John Greenwald: coming. So and  
I'm always fascinated by this

892

01:03:34,290 --> 01:03:38,340

and how it works, because I've  
tried to figure it out. So I'm

893

01:03:38,610 --> 01:03:40,980

glad that I have you on just  
simply to be able to ask you

894

01:03:40,980 --> 01:03:44,370

this. But when you get into like  
the f1 17, I think that was

895

01:03:44,370 --> 01:03:48,660

senior trend was the was the  
classified program name.

896

01:03:48,780 --> 01:03:51,840

Obviously, they're not going to  
publish senior trend. But there

897

01:03:51,840 --> 01:03:55,410

was an RFP for a program like  
that ultimately turned into SR

898

01:03:55,410 --> 01:03:59,940

trend in the F 117. There was  
also a half blue is gonna have

899

01:03:59,940 --> 01:04:03,810  
blue, there's tastes of blue,  
right? SR Spark, right SR Spark,

900  
01:04:03,810 --> 01:04:06,390  
I think was a CIA one. But the  
look back,

901  
01:04:06,420 --> 01:04:12,450  
John Ramirez: yeah, well, if you  
look at remove the labels, and

902  
01:04:12,450 --> 01:04:17,670  
the intent of that development,  
was to study radar absorbing

903  
01:04:17,670 --> 01:04:22,680  
materials, and not associated  
with a craft, or just giving you

904  
01:04:22,680 --> 01:04:25,890  
an example. If we're going to do  
something, we're not going to

905  
01:04:25,890 --> 01:04:29,100  
say we're doing it for this  
purpose. Because we have this

906  
01:04:29,100 --> 01:04:32,820  
mission and we want to target  
this adversary will look step

907  
01:04:32,820 --> 01:04:36,960  
back and say what technical  
capabilities are we looking for,

908  
01:04:37,170 --> 01:04:39,720  
and we'll publish what we're  
looking for in technical

909

01:04:39,720 --> 01:04:44,910  
capabilities and not link that  
to a specific program until we

910  
01:04:44,910 --> 01:04:47,940  
hire the contractor with those  
technical technical

911  
01:04:47,940 --> 01:04:52,320  
capabilities. Once a contractor  
has been hired, once they go

912  
01:04:52,320 --> 01:04:56,310  
through the whole process of  
acquisition and they're awarded

913  
01:04:56,310 --> 01:05:00,000  
the contract, then we make sure  
that they have the clearance

914  
01:05:00,000 --> 01:05:02,370  
People because we stipulate in  
our RFP what the clearance

915  
01:05:02,370 --> 01:05:07,800  
levels should be. And then if  
they have cleared people, we can

916  
01:05:07,800 --> 01:05:15,240  
then introduce these contractors  
to the program. So we don't have

917  
01:05:15,240 --> 01:05:20,340  
an RFP for programs necessarily,  
we have RFPs, to gather

918  
01:05:21,150 --> 01:05:25,980  
information on what companies  
can do a capability. That's the

919

01:05:25,980 --> 01:05:29,190  
best way I can explain it.  
Because I used to write RFPs for

920  
01:05:29,190 --> 01:05:33,930  
CIA. And so we're not saying  
that, you know, we want to we

921  
01:05:33,930 --> 01:05:38,850  
want to study this particular  
target. And the Soviet Union

922  
01:05:39,240 --> 01:05:41,970  
will say, Well, what  
capabilities are needed to bring

923  
01:05:41,970 --> 01:05:45,960  
to bear by this company in order  
to do that mission? So do you

924  
01:05:45,960 --> 01:05:50,670  
have engine electrical engineers  
with microwave backgrounds? Do

925  
01:05:50,670 --> 01:05:53,880  
you have you know, things like  
that? Do you have physicists,

926  
01:05:53,910 --> 01:05:57,180  
you have things like that? So do  
you have these people that have

927  
01:05:57,180 --> 01:06:02,910  
that background? And this in  
this broader field? And we pick

928  
01:06:02,910 --> 01:06:09,810  
a company that answers all that.  
And then when we award the

929

01:06:09,810 --> 01:06:13,590  
contract, we bring them to CIA?  
And then you say, Okay, this is

930  
01:06:13,590 --> 01:06:14,520  
a program you're working on?

931  
01:06:14,580 --> 01:06:17,250  
John Greenwald: And there's a  
classified aspects. So just to

932  
01:06:17,250 --> 01:06:20,130  
kind of button that, and I want  
to move on to the the present

933  
01:06:20,130 --> 01:06:27,240  
day stuff. Excuse me. So the  
potential contract or who sees

934  
01:06:27,270 --> 01:06:31,920  
the requirements in the public  
realm? They're not aware of the

935  
01:06:31,920 --> 01:06:35,340  
classified aspects, while they  
apply, right? I mean, they're

936  
01:06:35,340 --> 01:06:40,230  
not fed. He both prior to being  
accepted as the contractor,

937  
01:06:40,500 --> 01:06:44,220  
they're not fed what the  
classified aspects are, or are

938  
01:06:44,220 --> 01:06:48,150  
they so they go off of the  
public stuff you need, you know,

939  
01:06:48,150 --> 01:06:50,340

this type of expert, this type  
of expert, this type of

940

01:06:50,340 --> 01:06:55,530

facility, this type of  
clearance, but they're not fed

941

01:06:55,530 --> 01:07:00,930

the nonpublic classified portion  
of that contract until they are

942

01:07:00,930 --> 01:07:01,470

chosen

943

01:07:02,310 --> 01:07:05,010

John Ramirez: specific targets,  
we're not going to put that in

944

01:07:05,010 --> 01:07:11,970

an RFP, we're not going to put  
specific specific tools that we

945

01:07:11,970 --> 01:07:15,960

have that then we it's called  
government furnished equipment,

946

01:07:15,960 --> 01:07:19,140

GFP, we're not going to publish  
that. We just say, yeah, there's

947

01:07:19,170 --> 01:07:23,520

GFP available, which gives us  
the contractor say, okay,

948

01:07:23,520 --> 01:07:25,920

they're going to give me  
information or give me tools,

949

01:07:26,250 --> 01:07:29,610

that they're not stipulating

things of that nature. So you're

950

01:07:29,610 --> 01:07:35,220  
right, in the sense that we're  
not going to publish the target.

951

01:07:35,550 --> 01:07:41,220  
Gotcha. A RFP, I was also say  
that CIA does not need to

952

01:07:41,310 --> 01:07:48,030  
publish any of its RFPs. There's  
a cut a carve out for CIA, that

953

01:07:48,030 --> 01:07:51,870  
we are not required as part of  
the Federal Acquisition

954

01:07:51,870 --> 01:07:56,700  
Regulations to actually let out  
RFPs in the federal register in

955

01:07:56,700 --> 01:07:57,210  
the public.

956

01:07:58,440 --> 01:08:02,130  
John Greenwald: Gotcha. Okay. I  
think that answered my question

957

01:08:02,130 --> 01:08:05,400  
where I was going that with  
that, attributing it to us and

958

01:08:05,400 --> 01:08:08,760  
something I've talked about for  
quite a few years, on if the

959

01:08:08,790 --> 01:08:13,620  
paranormal and and UFO aspect  
was classified, which I can buy,

960

01:08:14,100 --> 01:08:17,910  
and it wouldn't be in the public  
announcement, which we've

961

01:08:17,910 --> 01:08:23,460  
established his true. How would  
Bigelow know to to hit the

962

01:08:23,460 --> 01:08:30,750  
jackpot by looking for a secret  
UFO program to take part of,

963

01:08:30,960 --> 01:08:34,170  
without knowing it was a UFO  
secret program, and he was the

964

01:08:34,170 --> 01:08:36,990  
only bidder. And I'm not trying  
to put you in a weird corner. So

965

01:08:36,990 --> 01:08:40,470  
if you don't want to comment on  
it, not a problem. I think that

966

01:08:40,470 --> 01:08:42,570  
was where I was going with it.  
Because I've never had somebody

967

01:08:42,570 --> 01:08:46,380  
in your position to give me that  
side of it. You wrote the RFPs,

968

01:08:46,380 --> 01:08:49,530  
and stuff like that. So that's  
why I wanted to ask, but do you

969

01:08:49,530 --> 01:08:50,488  
see where I'm going with that?

970

01:08:50,489 --> 01:08:53,909

John Ramirez: I do. I do see where you're going. I can't

971

01:08:53,909 --> 01:08:58,379

answer for bass or Robert Bigelow, specifically, because I

972

01:08:58,379 --> 01:09:01,349

wasn't part of that acquisition. But I can give you the general

973

01:09:01,349 --> 01:09:08,609

case. That it's not a secret that there there is a corps of

974

01:09:08,609 --> 01:09:13,109

contractors who work with the Defense Department and work with

975

01:09:13,349 --> 01:09:17,249

the intelligence community and CIA. There's just a corps of

976

01:09:17,369 --> 01:09:23,219

contractor companies that we go to all the time. So it's, it's

977

01:09:23,219 --> 01:09:29,099

like this close knit group of competitors. And so with

978

01:09:29,969 --> 01:09:35,729

Bigelow, I mean, he's done previous work at Skinwalker. So

979

01:09:35,729 --> 01:09:40,829

he has a lot of knowledge from the previous work at Skinwalker.

980

01:09:41,039 --> 01:09:45,659

So he has a leg up on anything that might come out as an RFP.

981

01:09:47,549 --> 01:09:50,819

My understanding is that Lockheed Martin was interested

982

01:09:50,849 --> 01:09:52,979

in the RFP but dropped it.

983

01:09:54,180 --> 01:09:57,540

John Greenwald: Yeah, there was a rumor it was reported that

984

01:09:57,540 --> 01:10:01,710

they actually submitted a proposal hoesel and then that was

985

01:10:01,950 --> 01:10:05,490

never officially retracted, but found out not to be true. When

986

01:10:05,490 --> 01:10:09,000

I'd spoken to the DIA and they said sole bitter. I mean, I

987

01:10:09,000 --> 01:10:11,580

triple checked that and pressed him and said, Hey, wait a

988

01:10:11,580 --> 01:10:14,640

minute, you know, and I think I even brought up Lockheed at the

989

01:10:14,640 --> 01:10:16,410

time. But yeah, it was,

990

01:10:16,920 --> 01:10:21,090

John Ramirez: they may have been interested. But I think a lot of

991

01:10:21,090 --> 01:10:25,140  
companies like Lockheed Martin,  
they hire people to do nothing

992

01:10:25,140 --> 01:10:28,380  
but contract work. Yeah, they  
hire armies of people who know

993

01:10:28,380 --> 01:10:32,760  
how to write RFPs. Yeah, and I  
mean, these RFPs are so specific

994

01:10:32,760 --> 01:10:36,030  
that I used to eliminate, we  
used to put in language to see

995

01:10:36,030 --> 01:10:39,540  
how compliant a contractor would  
be by stipulating the type of

996

01:10:39,540 --> 01:10:45,510  
paper, the weight of the paper,  
the font, the font used, and the

997

01:10:45,510 --> 01:10:49,800  
font size. And we put in every  
third page shall be pink, we

998

01:10:49,800 --> 01:10:53,160  
make sure that every third page  
is pink. Because if the third

999

01:10:53,160 --> 01:10:58,170  
page is white, we say you're not  
compliant. Tossed. I mean,

1000

01:10:58,170 --> 01:11:01,710

that's how specific we can be.  
So these people who know how to

1001

01:11:01,710 --> 01:11:05,160  
write this, understand the rules  
of the game, look for the fine

1002

01:11:05,160 --> 01:11:09,150  
print, look for the fine print,  
because they'll answer that RFP,

1003

01:11:09,510 --> 01:11:14,280  
specifically. And so as your  
specific question about Bigelow

1004

01:11:14,310 --> 01:11:19,230  
understanding that I wasn't part  
of the acquisition, sure. He's

1005

01:11:19,230 --> 01:11:23,580  
queued in to the intelligence  
community. We all know that. And

1006

01:11:24,060 --> 01:11:28,590  
he may have got wind that such  
an effort was going to start and

1007

01:11:28,590 --> 01:11:31,230  
he had an RFP go, ready.

1008

01:11:32,670 --> 01:11:34,410  
John Greenwald: Ready? Yeah, it  
was only up for a couple of

1009

01:11:34,410 --> 01:11:37,590  
weeks. And he was the only  
bidder. And yeah, and again, you

1010

01:11:37,590 --> 01:11:39,690  
know, a lot of people make a big

deal that I bring up the

1011

01:11:39,690 --> 01:11:43,860  
sweetheart deal thing for me, it  
puts it into perspective of what

1012

01:11:43,860 --> 01:11:48,450  
aos app was. But but again,  
those are entire shows in

1013

01:11:48,450 --> 01:11:50,850  
itself. And I appreciate you  
entertaining those questions.

1014

01:11:50,850 --> 01:11:54,240  
And yeah, and helping me  
understand some of that. I'm at

1015

01:11:54,240 --> 01:11:58,290  
the hour mark with you. And I  
don't want to take you take up

1016

01:11:58,290 --> 01:12:01,350  
your entire day with this. So  
let me kind of fast forward from

1017

01:12:01,350 --> 01:12:04,740  
the onset days, that regardless  
of what was official or not,

1018

01:12:04,800 --> 01:12:10,920  
here we are in 2022. Last year,  
June, the UAP report was

1019

01:12:11,130 --> 01:12:15,030  
published to the public big  
letdown to many people. I found

1020

01:12:15,030 --> 01:12:19,020  
some gems in it. But obviously

there was a big letdown. There

1021

01:12:19,020 --> 01:12:24,060  
are two observations that I had,  
I was surprised at so many

1022

01:12:24,330 --> 01:12:28,080  
agencies taking part and I put  
air quotes because we don't know

1023

01:12:28,230 --> 01:12:31,650  
how much parts some of these  
took in the report is about 13

1024

01:12:31,650 --> 01:12:35,430  
or 14, you know, named here.  
I've got it on my screen. The

1025

01:12:35,430 --> 01:12:38,700  
second observation I want to  
bring up to you is the CIA is

1026

01:12:38,700 --> 01:12:42,090  
absent. So just looking at this  
sheet, there's the Army, the

1027

01:12:42,090 --> 01:12:45,390  
Navy, the Air Force, so  
obviously the the obvious ones,

1028

01:12:45,540 --> 01:12:50,430  
but the NSA, the NGA, the NRO,  
the FBI, the DIA, NOAA, FAA,

1029

01:12:50,430 --> 01:12:55,980  
Nga. Nga was duplicated twice in  
the report. And so on. ODNI. So

1030

01:12:56,010 --> 01:12:59,010  
there's quite a few different

offices and agencies that took

1031

01:12:59,010 --> 01:13:03,480  
part but not the CIA. What are  
your thoughts about this public

1032

01:13:03,480 --> 01:13:07,800  
report, and specifically the  
lack of any CIA involvement, at

1033

01:13:07,800 --> 01:13:08,940  
least from what we're told?

1034

01:13:09,930 --> 01:13:16,200  
John Ramirez: Well, the  
department knew that the Senate

1035

01:13:16,320 --> 01:13:21,300  
Select Committee on Intelligence  
had queued up language for the

1036

01:13:21,690 --> 01:13:28,950  
intelligence Authorization Act,  
FY 21, about this UAP study, the

1037

01:13:28,950 --> 01:13:33,990  
department knew that ahead of  
time. And in order to get ahead

1038

01:13:33,990 --> 01:13:41,580  
of the narrative. The Department  
announced that from its

1039

01:13:41,580 --> 01:13:47,670  
understanding, in June, when the  
IAEA language became public, the

1040

01:13:47,670 --> 01:13:50,940  
department got ahead of the  
narrative, and said, Well, we're

1041

01:13:50,940 --> 01:13:54,330

not going to wait for this IAEA  
to be signed, because then

1042

01:13:54,330 --> 01:13:58,620

Congress would drive US Congress  
would be in charge, we're going

1043

01:13:58,620 --> 01:14:02,250

to get ahead of the narrative,  
and create this UAP Task Force

1044

01:14:02,280 --> 01:14:08,220

and announce it and put the Navy  
in charge. And so then we can

1045

01:14:08,220 --> 01:14:13,620

then stipulate what the scope of  
this investigation is going to

1046

01:14:13,620 --> 01:14:19,260

be not Congress. And so that's  
what happened. In my opinion.

1047

01:14:19,290 --> 01:14:23,430

Now, you might talk to other  
analysts who may disagree with

1048

01:14:23,430 --> 01:14:27,480

that. But I've seen that happen  
before, where the government

1049

01:14:27,480 --> 01:14:30,630

will get ahead of the narrative  
by saying, oh, we'll do it.

1050

01:14:30,990 --> 01:14:33,840

We'll do it. Don't legislate it.  
You can put the language in the

1051

01:14:33,840 --> 01:14:37,260

legislation. But don't worry,  
you'll get what you need. So

1052

01:14:37,260 --> 01:14:40,470

that's what the department did,  
I believe, to get ahead of the

1053

01:14:40,470 --> 01:14:44,310

narrative. So if you look at the  
announcement in August, and you

1054

01:14:44,310 --> 01:14:48,780

look at the report release in  
late June, they had more than

1055

01:14:48,780 --> 01:14:54,420

180 days to do this. They had a  
better part of a full year to do

1056

01:14:54,420 --> 01:15:00,120

this, because they wanted to  
control the narrative. And so I

1057

01:15:00,120 --> 01:15:01,260

believe that's what happened.

1058

01:15:01,650 --> 01:15:03,330

John Greenwald: It looks like  
they only took like three hours

1059

01:15:03,330 --> 01:15:04,560

to put it together, though,

1060

01:15:04,950 --> 01:15:07,890

John Ramirez: let me I'll  
address that. CIA was not

1061

01:15:07,890 --> 01:15:11,790  
involved because this effort was  
Department of Defense title 10.

1062  
01:15:12,240 --> 01:15:15,960  
CIA is not part of title 10, the  
Secretary of Defense cannot

1063  
01:15:16,110 --> 01:15:20,790  
order the CIA to do anything, or  
participate in anything. If

1064  
01:15:20,790 --> 01:15:23,760  
anything, it's going to be a  
request to the director of CIA,

1065  
01:15:24,120 --> 01:15:27,810  
you know, we invite you to this  
to this report. They did not do

1066  
01:15:27,810 --> 01:15:31,110  
that, because the department  
wanted to limit the scope of the

1067  
01:15:31,110 --> 01:15:36,330  
report to just what was publicly  
released in 2017. That is,

1068  
01:15:37,980 --> 01:15:45,000  
November, I think, was  
1227 2000. For the first tic tac

1069  
01:15:45,540 --> 01:15:49,200  
and Nimitz battle group. That's  
the start, and we're gonna end

1070  
01:15:49,200 --> 01:15:54,360  
it like, sometime in 2021. Yeah,  
that's it. That's the scope of

1071

01:15:54,360 --> 01:15:58,290  
the report. We don't want CIA to  
bring in its historical

1072

01:15:58,290 --> 01:16:02,610  
knowledge of everything to  
happen since Roswell. That's not

1073

01:16:02,610 --> 01:16:05,010  
going to be part of the report,  
we want to just hit the

1074

01:16:05,010 --> 01:16:05,670  
military.

1075

01:16:06,330 --> 01:16:09,090  
John Greenwald: So you think it  
was strategic to not include

1076

01:16:09,090 --> 01:16:13,380  
CIA, not just because it was a  
limitation of SecDef? And his,

1077

01:16:13,530 --> 01:16:17,010  
you know, mandate? Because I  
mean, the FAA is in their SEC,

1078

01:16:17,010 --> 01:16:18,930  
that doesn't have any, you know,  
exactly.

1079

01:16:19,320 --> 01:16:23,130  
John Ramirez: That's a good  
point. Because, you know, if

1080

01:16:23,130 --> 01:16:27,900  
they added CI, we'll see I  
wasn't invited. And CI had no

1081

01:16:27,900 --> 01:16:31,440

way of legally inserting itself  
into the report. It was

1082

01:16:31,440 --> 01:16:33,600  
Secretary defense type of time.  
So can I

1083

01:16:33,600 --> 01:16:36,450  
John Greenwald: ask, do you  
know, for 100% fact that they

1084

01:16:36,450 --> 01:16:41,070  
weren't invited? They were not  
invited? There were no put your

1085

01:16:41,070 --> 01:16:44,430  
call? And I'm only asking  
because I don't know. But so you

1086

01:16:44,430 --> 01:16:49,230  
don't think there was a any type  
of requests? And it was the CIA

1087

01:16:49,230 --> 01:16:53,040  
that said, hey, no, I don't want  
we're not SecDef got no

1088

01:16:53,070 --> 01:16:56,160  
jurisdiction over us. So we're  
not going to contribute. So you

1089

01:16:56,160 --> 01:16:59,550  
know, for a fact that there was  
never a line extended to CIA.

1090

01:17:02,010 --> 01:17:05,190  
John Ramirez: I can't reveal why  
I know that. Okay. I do know

1091

01:17:05,190 --> 01:17:10,740

that they were not formally  
invited to participate in the

1092

01:17:10,770 --> 01:17:14,880  
Navy UAP Task Force at all.

1093

01:17:15,750 --> 01:17:19,140  
John Greenwald: Now about the  
the new effort the aeoi, MSG

1094

01:17:21,450 --> 01:17:25,800  
UAP, tf is going away. aeoi MSG  
is coming aboard. Do you feel

1095

01:17:25,800 --> 01:17:28,920  
that there will be coordination  
there? Or do you think CIA is

1096

01:17:28,920 --> 01:17:29,580  
still going to be

1097

01:17:30,480 --> 01:17:32,790  
John Ramirez: the law states  
that needs to be coordination

1098

01:17:32,790 --> 01:17:36,720  
between the Secretary of Defense  
in coordination with the

1099

01:17:36,720 --> 01:17:40,080  
Director of National  
Intelligence. And so that's a

1100

01:17:40,320 --> 01:17:47,580  
way for CIA to participate in a  
MSG. And also, there is the

1101

01:17:47,820 --> 01:17:53,070  
intelligence Authorization Act,  
FY 22, where I'm not sure where

1102

01:17:53,070 --> 01:17:55,860

that went, but there was  
language in there, that was

1103

01:17:56,070 --> 01:18:03,060

somewhat different. The NDA  
tends to say, Okay, secretary of

1104

01:18:03,060 --> 01:18:08,400

defense, you need to have the  
coordination of DNI to do this

1105

01:18:08,430 --> 01:18:21,660

group aeoi MSG. But in the IAEA,  
its tells the DNI Okay. April

1106

01:18:21,660 --> 01:18:27,930

Haynes, you need to get the  
cooperation of the Department of

1107

01:18:27,930 --> 01:18:33,420

Defense, the Secretary of  
Defense to do this legislation

1108

01:18:34,710 --> 01:18:40,920

stipulated program. So on the,  
on the NDA side, It's 180 day

1109

01:18:40,920 --> 01:18:46,380

interval report. On the IA psi,  
it's a 90 day interval report.

1110

01:18:47,370 --> 01:18:50,490

So it's like two different  
pieces of legislation. And I

1111

01:18:50,490 --> 01:18:54,870

don't know if the IA language  
for UAPs is still in there. It's

1112

01:18:54,870 --> 01:19:01,110  
much shorter. The NDAA is much  
broader, much in depth, and so

1113

01:19:01,140 --> 01:19:04,650  
I'm not sure what happened to  
it. But there's two pieces of

1114

01:19:04,650 --> 01:19:07,320  
legislation. And I don't know  
how they're gonna resolve who's

1115

01:19:07,320 --> 01:19:12,480  
in charge, because on the Senate  
side, IAEA, it's the DNI getting

1116

01:19:12,480 --> 01:19:16,350  
the cooperation as Secretary of  
Defense on the NDAA side, which

1117

01:19:16,350 --> 01:19:19,530  
came out of the House Armed  
Services Committee. It is then

1118

01:19:19,530 --> 01:19:24,990  
the or, yeah, I think I'm right.  
It's the it's the cooperation of

1119

01:19:24,990 --> 01:19:27,870  
the DNI underneath the Secretary  
of Defense.

1120

01:19:27,960 --> 01:19:30,450  
John Greenewald: Yeah, I'm glad  
it's not confusing at all, John,

1121

01:19:30,450 --> 01:19:30,990  
because,

1122

01:19:31,679 --> 01:19:36,059

John Ramirez: well, I mean, I'm upset at the aeoi. The MSG part.

1123

01:19:36,299 --> 01:19:40,889

Yeah. Because that's management synchronization. Yeah. Me

1124

01:19:40,889 --> 01:19:46,349

implies. Okay. Department. Let's get our story straight of what

1125

01:19:46,349 --> 01:19:49,079

we tell Congress. Why is it called management

1126

01:19:49,079 --> 01:19:52,379

synchronization? Management synchronizing? What

1127

01:19:52,770 --> 01:19:53,340

John Greenwald: Yeah,

1128

01:19:53,400 --> 01:19:57,330

John Ramirez: you know, object. Airborne object identification,

1129

01:19:57,330 --> 01:20:01,200

that sounds great, but when you manage the identification and

1130

01:20:01,200 --> 01:20:04,350

synchronize in a vacation according to what the department

1131

01:20:04,350 --> 01:20:08,940

wants, that tends to tell me that we're not going to get a

1132

01:20:08,940 --> 01:20:10,590  
lot of what we really want.

1133

01:20:12,150 --> 01:20:14,220  
John Greenwald: You know, I'm  
at the tail end of the time that

1134

01:20:14,220 --> 01:20:18,780  
I have with you, and I really  
appreciate your time. If I can

1135

01:20:18,810 --> 01:20:21,360  
just ask you one one last  
question with your time in the

1136

01:20:21,360 --> 01:20:24,570  
in the CIA and, and it sounds  
like you've had a lot of

1137

01:20:24,570 --> 01:20:28,350  
knowledge over the years that  
now you're being able to, to

1138

01:20:28,350 --> 01:20:32,820  
come out with, do you have any  
regrets over the last, you know,

1139

01:20:32,820 --> 01:20:38,580  
25 years with your career of the  
CIA or, or, you know, even post

1140

01:20:38,580 --> 01:20:41,250  
retirement anything that you  
look back and wanted to do

1141

01:20:41,250 --> 01:20:42,420  
different with your time?

1142

01:20:42,780 --> 01:20:45,870  
John Ramirez: Well, knowing that

the working group started in

1143

01:20:46,260 --> 01:20:50,190  
around late 2004 and went  
through 2005, I was chief of the

1144

01:20:50,190 --> 01:20:54,690  
Elan Analysis Branch. My regret  
was not hiring Eric W. Davis,

1145

01:20:54,690 --> 01:20:58,410  
when he applied for a job at  
CIA. And that was my deepest

1146

01:20:58,410 --> 01:21:01,140  
regret, knowing what his  
capabilities are, and knowing

1147

01:21:01,290 --> 01:21:04,500  
participation in the study of  
this phenomenon. I wish I would

1148

01:21:04,500 --> 01:21:06,720  
have hired him, because I would  
have sent him to the working

1149

01:21:06,720 --> 01:21:06,960  
group.

1150

01:21:07,110 --> 01:21:10,560  
John Greenwald: So Dr. Eric  
Davis had applied for the CIA,

1151

01:21:10,830 --> 01:21:15,390  
in your, in the eland, the make  
sure I have it. electronic

1152

01:21:15,390 --> 01:21:17,010  
intelligence analysis branch,

1153

01:21:17,040 --> 01:21:21,090

John Ramirez: he actually apply  
for a broader job category

1154

01:21:21,210 --> 01:21:27,930

known as St. W, but scientific,  
technical and weapons. And so

1155

01:21:27,960 --> 01:21:33,840

that is usually the place where  
scientists, physicists,

1156

01:21:33,930 --> 01:21:37,380

chemists, biologists, you name  
it, electrical engineers,

1157

01:21:37,380 --> 01:21:41,130

mechanical engineers, that's the  
job category that they would

1158

01:21:41,130 --> 01:21:45,990

check off when they apply for a  
job. So he was St. W. And so his

1159

01:21:45,990 --> 01:21:54,270

resume in his application  
package, went to hiring advisors

1160

01:21:54,600 --> 01:21:57,690

in the weapons intelligence  
nonproliferation Arms Control

1161

01:21:57,690 --> 01:22:02,130

Center, my parent office. So  
it's logical that it went to

1162

01:22:02,160 --> 01:22:05,580

knowing the structure of wind  
pack, it would have gone to the

1163

01:22:05,580 --> 01:22:09,450  
missile and space group, and  
particularly in the space group,

1164

01:22:09,990 --> 01:22:13,050  
because of his background, and  
it also perhaps in the missile

1165

01:22:13,050 --> 01:22:18,540  
group, missile part of the MSG.  
And I believe he had interviews

1166

01:22:18,540 --> 01:22:24,900  
because I learned about his  
application from my colleague,

1167

01:22:24,990 --> 01:22:32,430  
branch chief, who was chief of  
management in CIA. And he

1168

01:22:32,430 --> 01:22:36,300  
interviewed Eric Davis after he  
came downstairs and escorted

1169

01:22:36,300 --> 01:22:42,930  
downstairs to this signature.  
Branch. And he was interviewed

1170

01:22:42,930 --> 01:22:43,350  
there.

1171

01:22:44,430 --> 01:22:46,290  
John Greenwald: Have you? I'm  
just curious, have you talked

1172

01:22:46,290 --> 01:22:49,200  
about that before? publicly?

1173

01:22:49,380 --> 01:22:53,340

John Ramirez: No, no. But if you ask me, like, what's my deepest

1174

01:22:53,340 --> 01:22:57,240  
regret? I deeply regret that,  
because he would have just been

1175

01:22:57,240 --> 01:23:01,290  
saying individual talk to and  
because I looked at his it's

1176

01:23:01,290 --> 01:23:04,950  
more than a resume is more like  
a CV. I mean, he listed a lot of

1177

01:23:04,950 --> 01:23:11,010  
detail. And it's an a CV, and  
knowing his background. I wish I

1178

01:23:11,010 --> 01:23:13,470  
would have hired him, in  
hindsight, knowing that there

1179

01:23:13,470 --> 01:23:18,450  
was a OHRP Working Group  
starting up. Yeah. But the

1180

01:23:18,480 --> 01:23:24,240  
signature, Branch Chief  
signatures Branch Chief had it

1181

01:23:24,240 --> 01:23:29,940  
me his application package for  
me to review. And I noticed that

1182

01:23:29,940 --> 01:23:32,490  
you know, this is a brilliant  
guy. I mean, no doubt about it.

1183

01:23:32,490 --> 01:23:37,560

He is brilliant. Beyond Belief,  
I mean, outstanding guy. And I

1184

01:23:37,560 --> 01:23:40,710  
looked at the projects he worked  
for, for the Air Force Research

1185

01:23:40,710 --> 01:23:49,110  
Lab. I read his paper, CIA has a  
requirement to submit writing

1186

01:23:49,110 --> 01:23:52,350  
samples, particularly in the  
director of intelligence was all

1187

01:23:52,350 --> 01:23:57,210  
about writing. Yeah. And He  
submitted his paper on

1188

01:23:57,510 --> 01:24:04,260  
teleportation physics, which I  
read. And it was dated 2004. And

1189

01:24:04,260 --> 01:24:07,500  
I remember oh, this is a recent  
paper, because it was the same

1190

01:24:07,500 --> 01:24:12,450  
calendar year later, after he  
published that paper for AF FRL.

1191

01:24:13,680 --> 01:24:18,630  
But he, he was in the building  
on escorted, escorted, he had to

1192

01:24:18,630 --> 01:24:22,920  
have an escort. And that means  
that he did not have a top

1193

01:24:22,920 --> 01:24:27,510

secret sei clearance that he passed to us. He didn't pass

1194

01:24:27,510 --> 01:24:31,620  
clearances to us to get a different kind of badge instead

1195

01:24:31,620 --> 01:24:35,310  
of a visitor's badge that required an escort. Okay, all

1196

01:24:35,310 --> 01:24:43,350  
times even going to the bathroom. He he does the badge

1197

01:24:43,350 --> 01:24:47,880  
he had and he did not have the no escort required badge, which

1198

01:24:47,880 --> 01:24:51,510  
means that you passed your clearances at the SEI level. Do

1199

01:24:51,510 --> 01:24:55,110  
you remember what year this was? If I may ask 2004 Because when I

1200

01:24:55,110 --> 01:24:59,010  
looked at his paper, teleportation physics, I

1201

01:24:59,010 --> 01:25:02,100  
remarked Oh, this is A very recent paper he just he just

1202

01:25:02,130 --> 01:25:04,800  
John Greenewald: published it. So that means he didn't have any

1203

01:25:04,800 --> 01:25:06,960

clearance or didn't have a top secret. He didn't have a top

1204

01:25:06,960 --> 01:25:07,290  
secret

1205

01:25:07,290 --> 01:25:11,640  
John Ramirez: SCI clearance.  
Okay. And when it to CIA for

1206

01:25:11,640 --> 01:25:14,940  
those interviews, I

1207

01:25:14,940 --> 01:25:16,980  
John Greenwald: have to if you  
don't mind, can I take you for a

1208

01:25:16,980 --> 01:25:22,110  
couple more minutes? Are you  
okay? So with that, the two

1209

01:25:22,110 --> 01:25:24,870  
questions I have and one you may  
not be able to answer, but very

1210

01:25:24,870 --> 01:25:27,720  
quickly was he hired but I know  
you said you didn't hire him but

1211

01:25:27,720 --> 01:25:29,070  
did somebody else at CIA.

1212

01:25:31,470 --> 01:25:34,260  
John Ramirez: My part of impact  
did not hire the signature

1213

01:25:34,860 --> 01:25:41,460  
branch, the eland branch. We  
didn't hire him. And he wasn't I

1214

01:25:41,460 --> 01:25:44,940  
did not see him and went pack  
spaces. In the places that I

1215

01:25:44,940 --> 01:25:47,700  
should see him at that missile  
and space group Park. I'm sure

1216

01:25:48,450 --> 01:25:52,350  
he wasn't in there. So not to  
say that somebody might have

1217

01:25:52,350 --> 01:25:56,700  
seen his his application package  
and may say, Hey, this is a

1218

01:25:56,700 --> 01:25:58,530  
great guy that we can consult,

1219

01:25:58,530 --> 01:26:00,570  
John Greenwald: bring him over  
here. Yeah, gotcha. Yeah, you

1220

01:26:00,570 --> 01:26:01,260  
guys die.

1221

01:26:01,380 --> 01:26:04,140  
John Ramirez: But we, we didn't  
we didn't hire him as a blue

1222

01:26:04,140 --> 01:26:07,950  
badge employee, not to say that  
he may have. He may have

1223

01:26:07,950 --> 01:26:11,550  
attracted enough interest to be  
introduced to other people in

1224

01:26:11,550 --> 01:26:15,570

the IC saying, Hey, this guy,  
you know, he's very interesting.

1225

01:26:15,600 --> 01:26:18,840

We didn't hire him as a blue  
badge staffer, but you might be

1226

01:26:18,840 --> 01:26:22,050

interested in it. I don't know  
if he's served as a consult of

1227

01:26:22,050 --> 01:26:25,170

capacity at all. As an  
independent contractor. I don't

1228

01:26:25,170 --> 01:26:27,930

have that knowledge. I do know  
he was escorted because my

1229

01:26:27,930 --> 01:26:34,800

engineer escorted him down the  
hall to a snack. Stan, and CIA

1230

01:26:34,800 --> 01:26:38,250

officers are no it's Ron and  
Sally snacks down on the ground

1231

01:26:38,250 --> 01:26:41,700

floor where my branch was  
located. Yeah, Ron and Sally.

1232

01:26:42,060 --> 01:26:46,290

Ron was blind. And he was very  
affectionately liked by all CIA

1233

01:26:46,290 --> 01:26:49,500

officers who served during when  
they had snacks. So that

1234

01:26:49,500 --> 01:26:54,120

validates, okay. Yeah, Ron and Sally snacks. And my, my

1235

01:26:54,120 --> 01:26:56,850  
engineer that I did sent it all or working group, one of them

1236

01:26:57,150 --> 01:27:00,420  
was escorting him. And he was introduced to a colleague of

1237

01:27:00,420 --> 01:27:04,680  
mine, and another branch, who I witnessed the fact that oh,

1238

01:27:04,680 --> 01:27:06,450  
yeah, he just had a visitor's badge.

1239

01:27:07,110 --> 01:27:10,920  
John Greenwald: Wow. So this was 2004. He said, and yeah, I

1240

01:27:10,920 --> 01:27:13,710  
always like to put everything in chronological order, because

1241

01:27:13,710 --> 01:27:16,590  
that's the best way to put together a puzzle. But I, I,

1242

01:27:16,650 --> 01:27:19,650  
you're familiar with the Eric Davis, Thomas Wilson notes,

1243

01:27:19,650 --> 01:27:22,770  
whatever you want to call them. I've done quite a few different

1244

01:27:22,770 --> 01:27:25,830

videos on it. I'm a huge skeptic when it comes to these notes.

1245

01:27:26,790 --> 01:27:29,610

But since you have this kind of knowledge around the timeframe,

1246

01:27:29,610 --> 01:27:35,100

it was allegedly October of 2002, when Eric Davis met with

1247

01:27:35,400 --> 01:27:40,500

allegedly Admiral Thomas Wilson and Wilson, as a J. Two decided

1248

01:27:40,500 --> 01:27:44,760

to spill all these, you know, highly classified secrets in Las

1249

01:27:44,760 --> 01:27:48,450

Vegas. Based on what you've seen, do you have an opinion on

1250

01:27:48,450 --> 01:27:53,130

those notes? And if he's not cleared, why would Wilson then I

1251

01:27:53,130 --> 01:27:55,800

really want to ask the question, why would Wilson do that?

1252

01:27:56,790 --> 01:27:59,970

John Ramirez: Well, I'm Eric Davis was a member of an

1253

01:27:59,970 --> 01:28:02,610

organization. I'm a member of the association, former

1254

01:28:02,610 --> 01:28:06,030

intelligence officers. And you don't have to be an intelligence

1255

01:28:06,030 --> 01:28:12,510

officer to be a member of the AFI Oh, you just have to be a

1256

01:28:12,510 --> 01:28:17,400

person who has worked with intelligence or work with the

1257

01:28:17,400 --> 01:28:22,680

military intelligence side. And so he knew people who were in

1258

01:28:22,680 --> 01:28:27,150

the Las Vegas chapter because he was a member. And the last Vegas

1259

01:28:27,150 --> 01:28:33,120

chapter members about vouched for Eric Davis to Admiral

1260

01:28:33,120 --> 01:28:37,170

Wilson. So that was one of the ways to Admiral Wilson, you that

1261

01:28:37,170 --> 01:28:40,170

Eric gave us was real deal in terms of, you know, the fact

1262

01:28:40,170 --> 01:28:43,080

that he is associated in some way with the intelligence

1263

01:28:43,080 --> 01:28:44,520

community or with military,

1264

01:28:44,820 --> 01:28:47,520

John Greenwald: according to

the story or you have knowledge

1265

01:28:47,520 --> 01:28:50,820  
of that. He's a member of the  
AFI. Oh, yeah. No, no, I

1266

01:28:50,820 --> 01:28:53,790  
understand that I'm talking  
about the vouching to Admiral

1267

01:28:53,790 --> 01:28:57,390  
Wilson. Is that a story you've  
heard? Or you have direct

1268

01:28:57,390 --> 01:28:58,320  
knowledge? No, that's,

1269

01:28:58,350 --> 01:29:01,350  
John Ramirez: that's based on a  
good point that you have John,

1270

01:29:01,380 --> 01:29:03,510  
that was based on reading the  
notes.

1271

01:29:04,410 --> 01:29:07,590  
John Greenewald: Okay, gotcha.  
So, so we're going out, gotcha.

1272

01:29:08,700 --> 01:29:11,400  
John Ramirez: The other thing  
that I have knowledge of is that

1273

01:29:13,770 --> 01:29:18,690  
he EMG is the we call the  
operations operations and

1274

01:29:18,690 --> 01:29:23,580  
maintenance contractor for area  
51. They run the security, they

1275

01:29:23,580 --> 01:29:28,170  
provide all of the services,  
just the logistical support of

1276

01:29:28,170 --> 01:29:32,580  
running that facility. And it  
may provide some analytic

1277

01:29:32,580 --> 01:29:36,930  
support as well. That's  
interesting that I went to E and

1278

01:29:36,930 --> 01:29:44,190  
G. When I was at a facility next  
to area 51. I went to the DOE

1279

01:29:46,140 --> 01:29:51,030  
facility to get batched so I was  
surprised that occurred an EE

1280

01:29:51,030 --> 01:29:55,350  
G's parking lot. According to  
the notes, I didn't know why

1281

01:29:55,380 --> 01:29:57,930  
that would be but maybe Mr.  
Wilson had some business there

1282

01:29:57,930 --> 01:29:59,670  
to do. Do you feel that

1283

01:29:59,670 --> 01:30:02,040  
John Greenwald: happened? Just  
out of curiosity based on?

1284

01:30:03,449 --> 01:30:06,329  
John Ramirez: Well, as you know,  
I say, embrace widely hold

1285

01:30:06,329 --> 01:30:10,529

lightly. And since I don't have any first hand knowledge, I hold

1286

01:30:10,529 --> 01:30:14,159

that lightly. But I embrace it widely that it's possible that

1287

01:30:14,159 --> 01:30:17,249

could have occurred. What I don't believe occurred was

1288

01:30:17,249 --> 01:30:20,489

Admiral Wilson salt that memorandum allegedly from the

1289

01:30:20,489 --> 01:30:23,789

NRO and said, by golly, I need to get to the bottom of this.

1290

01:30:23,879 --> 01:30:25,499

That is complete nonsense.

1291

01:30:26,039 --> 01:30:28,889

John Greenwald: I did a pretty big breakdown of that, the that

1292

01:30:28,889 --> 01:30:34,769

memo and and how that anchored the whole story. And that that,

1293

01:30:34,769 --> 01:30:37,829

to me, is one of the biggest tells in my opinion. Again, this

1294

01:30:37,829 --> 01:30:41,849

is just my opinion, on why there's not a whole lot of truth

1295

01:30:41,849 --> 01:30:46,499  
to this, because the entire  
story hinges on that memo. And

1296

01:30:46,499 --> 01:30:49,319  
in my opinion, the memos bunk,  
you brought up the memo, if

1297

01:30:49,319 --> 01:30:52,289  
you're familiar with a Do you  
feel that the memos bunk yet is

1298

01:30:52,319 --> 01:30:56,219  
completely bunk? So you So you  
agree that that memo was just

1299

01:30:56,369 --> 01:30:56,939  
not wasn't

1300

01:30:56,940 --> 01:30:59,190  
John Ramirez: the that wasn't  
the impetus for Admiral Wilson

1301

01:31:06,929 --> 01:30:59,580  
to

1302

01:31:06,929 --> 01:31:09,539  
mean, that that's the legend  
anyway. And that's, that's the

1303

01:31:09,539 --> 01:31:13,019  
story. So for me, it falls apart  
from there. But again, going

1304

01:31:13,019 --> 01:31:16,859  
back to what you feel, I mean,  
do you feel there's any truth to

1305

01:31:16,859 --> 01:31:17,609  
that story?

1306

01:31:20,340 --> 01:31:28,140

John Ramirez: I would give some possibility that Eric Davis was

1307

01:31:28,140 --> 01:31:34,980

known to Admiral Wilson in some capacity. That's me being very

1308

01:31:34,980 --> 01:31:38,700

generous. I don't think they were like 100% complete

1309

01:31:38,700 --> 01:31:43,320

strangers. I don't think Admiral Wilson would look at our gave us

1310

01:31:43,320 --> 01:31:47,100

and who is this guy? Because Eric Davis worked closely with

1311

01:31:47,100 --> 01:31:52,650

the Air Force Research Lab. And so I would imagine that someone

1312

01:31:52,680 --> 01:31:56,880

in the capacity of j to the joint chiefs of staff would know

1313

01:31:56,880 --> 01:32:01,800

about with the work of the AF RL. And so in that capacity,

1314

01:32:01,830 --> 01:32:06,630

there might be some linkage there. But to say that, Admiral

1315

01:32:06,630 --> 01:32:11,400

Wilson wanted to speak with Eric Davis because he sought this

1316

01:32:11,460 --> 01:32:15,240

memorandum. Admiral Wilson was  
look at that, and no, it was

1317

01:32:15,240 --> 01:32:20,670

completely faked. Yeah, I was  
eland and it listed eland What

1318

01:32:20,670 --> 01:32:25,170

is it Elan ops. There's no such  
thing as Elan ops. I was eland I

1319

01:32:25,170 --> 01:32:29,760

know people at NSA eland I know  
the Elan community throughout

1320

01:32:29,760 --> 01:32:33,090

the military, military  
intelligence side and the

1321

01:32:33,360 --> 01:32:37,140

civilian IC side. There's no  
such thing as Elan ops or you

1322

01:32:37,140 --> 01:32:42,060

know, all these other they put  
us address C's in the format was

1323

01:32:42,060 --> 01:32:46,080

a complete wrong. Central  
Security Service is the uniform

1324

01:32:46,080 --> 01:32:49,830

cryptologic service elements at  
NSA. They're the people wearing

1325

01:32:49,830 --> 01:32:53,850

uniforms, members of the  
military who work at NSA in the

1326

01:32:53,850 --> 01:33:00,570  
second field, in our role in our  
roles. organization chart would

1327

01:33:00,570 --> 01:33:03,780  
not have central security  
services there. Yeah. And in a

1328

01:33:03,780 --> 01:33:05,700  
row, it's not part of the Air  
Force folks.

1329

01:33:05,939 --> 01:33:07,229  
John Greenewald: Yeah. You know,

1330

01:33:07,229 --> 01:33:09,179  
John Ramirez: there's a lot of  
times I mean, so yeah, a lot of

1331

01:33:09,179 --> 01:33:12,719  
problems. And plus all of the  
units that list down, I have a

1332

01:33:12,719 --> 01:33:16,649  
list of where every unit was  
stationed. And, you know, I find

1333

01:33:16,649 --> 01:33:20,489  
it strange that one of the wings  
fighter wings was stationed at

1334

01:33:20,489 --> 01:33:27,359  
Tinker Air Force Base in  
Oklahoma. And so why would you

1335

01:33:27,359 --> 01:33:31,829  
know, this, the entire intent  
was of the memo was? Oh, you

1336

01:33:31,829 --> 01:33:35,549

know, we found out that these  
UFO researchers are going to be

1337

01:33:35,549 --> 01:33:39,239

at the little alien N and Rachel  
LaMotta. And we want to shut

1338

01:33:39,239 --> 01:33:43,559

down all operations. Right? And  
they listed like some of these

1339

01:33:43,559 --> 01:33:46,559

units in the Air Force, they're  
real units, somebody did their

1340

01:33:46,559 --> 01:33:50,759

homework, but they just pick and  
chose pick and choose, like,

1341

01:33:51,119 --> 01:33:55,289

cafeteria style, or what sounds  
good. You know, what, what can

1342

01:33:55,289 --> 01:34:00,659

we find that may have had some  
associated area 51 Just throw it

1343

01:34:00,659 --> 01:34:04,499

in the report. So I mean, I have  
a lot of problems with that

1344

01:34:04,529 --> 01:34:07,199

mission operations. Moc, by the  
way stands for Mission

1345

01:34:07,199 --> 01:34:11,249

Operations Center, that sort of  
stand for and a note like that

1346

01:34:11,249 --> 01:34:13,979

it was legitimate. We're not go  
to the LCS of these

1347

01:34:13,979 --> 01:34:21,449

organizations, or these fighter  
wings. Every every unit involved

1348

01:34:21,479 --> 01:34:27,089

in intelligence would have a  
SSL, every Pentagon unit, every

1349

01:34:27,089 --> 01:34:30,689

department of defense unit will  
have an SSL, a special security

1350

01:34:30,689 --> 01:34:34,199

office and that's the recipient.  
And for the top part, it

1351

01:34:34,199 --> 01:34:39,809

wouldn't go to Elan Mo, even  
ops. Yeah, it was said NSA s to

1352

01:34:40,139 --> 01:34:41,009

SSL.

1353

01:34:42,450 --> 01:34:45,630

John Greenwald: Yeah, it was.  
It was definitely a mess. Let me

1354

01:34:45,660 --> 01:34:49,980

the final question. Bottom line  
real quick, beyond the memo,

1355

01:34:50,010 --> 01:34:55,170

because then the biggest  
supporters of this story, have

1356

01:34:55,170 --> 01:34:59,070  
kind of dismissed my critique of  
the memo saying oh, well then

1357  
01:34:59,100 --> 01:35:02,340  
the memo is not a big deal. deal  
anymore to the story, even

1358  
01:35:02,340 --> 01:35:04,890  
though it's been bantered about  
since day one. But now we take

1359  
01:35:04,890 --> 01:35:07,230  
that out. And it's like, oh,  
well, it's not a big deal. So

1360  
01:35:07,230 --> 01:35:09,570  
let's take the memo out of the  
equation, you look at the notes,

1361  
01:35:09,570 --> 01:35:13,650  
you look at the idea and concept  
that Wilson would would spill

1362  
01:35:13,650 --> 01:35:16,140  
the secrets, I know, you said  
that it's a possibility that he

1363  
01:35:16,140 --> 01:35:20,700  
would know him. And or know of  
him. Write with your experience

1364  
01:35:20,700 --> 01:35:25,800  
being top secret sei cleared  
working for the CIA. And, again,

1365  
01:35:25,800 --> 01:35:29,430  
this bio is amazing. So it kind  
of speaks for itself with your

1366

01:35:29,430 --> 01:35:33,300  
intelligence, background and  
clearances. Do you see that

1367

01:35:33,300 --> 01:35:37,770  
happening with a j two.

1368

01:35:41,939 --> 01:35:46,619  
John Ramirez: With a J. Two, at  
his position in the Joint Chiefs

1369

01:35:46,619 --> 01:35:52,379  
of Staff, the possibility that  
he may not be aware of the

1370

01:35:52,769 --> 01:35:58,709  
programmatic details, I find  
that to be credible. But he

1371

01:35:58,709 --> 01:36:03,839  
would know the fact of that they  
might be an effort to reverse

1372

01:36:03,839 --> 01:36:08,699  
engineer some of these craft. So  
that's one level, but to know

1373

01:36:08,699 --> 01:36:13,319  
where it's being done, to know  
how much money is being placed

1374

01:36:13,349 --> 01:36:19,229  
in these programs, to know like  
results of these programs, to

1375

01:36:19,229 --> 01:36:23,669  
actually go to these these  
facilities and see these craft

1376

01:36:26,279 --> 01:36:31,709

that go either way, depending on  
how sensitive that program

1377

01:36:31,919 --> 01:36:36,809

really is, and what I can bring  
from personal experience that I

1378

01:36:36,809 --> 01:36:42,299

was involved in a controlled  
access program at CIA. And I had

1379

01:36:42,299 --> 01:36:46,979

the biggest list for that  
program. And as the program was

1380

01:36:46,979 --> 01:36:50,789

winding down, I was given the  
biggest list, I was made the

1381

01:36:50,819 --> 01:36:55,199

control officer for the program,  
a job I did not relish and I got

1382

01:36:55,199 --> 01:37:00,599

rid of as fast as I could. But I  
was given a big list. And on the

1383

01:37:00,599 --> 01:37:05,399

bucket list were the names,  
birth dates and social security

1384

01:37:05,639 --> 01:37:11,939

numbers of the current president  
and former presidents. So I know

1385

01:37:11,939 --> 01:37:16,469

that you know, that bigger list  
is everything. And but you know,

1386

01:37:16,469 --> 01:37:21,209

I didn't see this program was something that James McCaskey

1387

01:37:21,899 --> 01:37:27,119  
would have interested because it was part of his job to look at

1388

01:37:27,179 --> 01:37:30,179  
ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defense. So we were

1389

01:37:30,179 --> 01:37:36,629  
collecting at a covert facility, this data, and I did not see any

1390

01:37:36,659 --> 01:37:41,819  
very many dia people on it. In fact, the DIA people would have

1391

01:37:41,819 --> 01:37:44,789  
been at missile and space Intelligence Center in

1392

01:37:44,789 --> 01:37:49,259  
Huntsville, Alabama. And they were not on it. In fact, Neysa

1393

01:37:49,319 --> 01:37:52,799  
Air National Air and Space Intelligence Center, they were

1394

01:37:52,799 --> 01:37:57,269  
not on it. It was just CIA, State Department because we need

1395

01:37:57,269 --> 01:38:02,849  
an entry into that country. And the President, National Security

1396

01:38:02,849 --> 01:38:07,379

Advisor, Secretary defense was  
on it. Secretary of State at

1397

01:38:07,379 --> 01:38:10,889

that level. I didn't see like  
Joint Chiefs of Staff, I saw

1398

01:38:10,919 --> 01:38:14,429

Secretary of the Air Force. But  
I didn't see Secretary of the

1399

01:38:14,429 --> 01:38:14,699

Navy

1400

01:38:14,729 --> 01:38:17,069

John Greenwald: and the former  
presidents I assume was the they

1401

01:38:17,069 --> 01:38:19,589

were being read through the  
Presidential Daily briefs, which

1402

01:38:19,589 --> 01:38:20,369

they still get

1403

01:38:21,570 --> 01:38:26,640

John Ramirez: off that program.  
After they leave office.

1404

01:38:26,820 --> 01:38:28,710

John Greenwald: Yeah, you were  
saying former? Were you

1405

01:38:28,710 --> 01:38:32,340

referencing president at the  
time but former right? Yeah, I

1406

01:38:32,340 --> 01:38:32,970

gotcha. Okay.

1407

01:38:33,210 --> 01:38:35,310

John Ramirez: bigot list  
included everyone who has ever

1408

01:38:35,310 --> 01:38:38,400

read into the program. Gotcha.  
Okay. So you know, I saw

1409

01:38:38,460 --> 01:38:41,490

Secretary of State, current  
Secretary of State former,

1410

01:38:41,760 --> 01:38:44,700

anybody was read in the program  
and I short bigger list. My name

1411

01:38:44,700 --> 01:38:48,180

was on it. Gotcha. With my  
Social Security and birthday.

1412

01:38:48,570 --> 01:38:51,960

What was the program name? John.  
I can say this now because it

1413

01:38:51,960 --> 01:38:55,230

didn't get redacted. Okay, I  
can't say the program named but

1414

01:38:55,590 --> 01:38:58,410

the Central Intelligence Agency  
in the People's Liberation Army

1415

01:38:58,410 --> 01:39:01,170

of the People's Republic of  
China had an intelligence

1416

01:39:01,170 --> 01:39:07,830

sharing agreement, to the point  
where the CIA built SIGINT

1417

01:39:07,860 --> 01:39:12,690

collection facilities in China  
and trained Chinese officers and

1418

01:39:12,690 --> 01:39:19,110

how to operate our equipment to  
collect against Soviet and then

1419

01:39:19,110 --> 01:39:23,100

later Russian ballistic missile  
tests. So we were sitting side

1420

01:39:23,100 --> 01:39:27,810

by side with our counterparts in  
Chinese intelligence, we

1421

01:39:27,870 --> 01:39:30,900

provided them with a lot of  
intelligence that you as an

1422

01:39:30,900 --> 01:39:35,130

American system now can't see.  
But there are folks in China,

1423

01:39:35,940 --> 01:39:39,510

our erstwhile adversary that saw  
this intelligence where we

1424

01:39:39,510 --> 01:39:42,840

couldn't even share it with our  
own American people. Yeah. So

1425

01:39:42,840 --> 01:39:47,220

that's, that's how like, some of  
these programs get so deep that

1426

01:39:47,220 --> 01:39:54,390

very few people can be a prized  
of it. And even people who would

1427

01:39:54,390 --> 01:39:59,190

have an equity in analyzing that data, were never given that data

1428

01:40:00,000 --> 01:40:04,890

NSA had it, NSA was apprised of it, because they are the Signet

1429

01:40:04,890 --> 01:40:07,590

mission Mission Manager. And the functional Mission Manager for

1430

01:40:07,590 --> 01:40:12,030

sigma is director of NSA turns up. So in a say was read into

1431

01:40:12,030 --> 01:40:18,480

it. And when I went out there to travel to be Chief of Operations

1432

01:40:18,480 --> 01:40:22,890

at one of the sites that we built, my counterpart was NSA.

1433

01:40:24,030 --> 01:40:27,450

But he didn't go us in to say, he went to CIA, he had to leave

1434

01:40:27,450 --> 01:40:34,920

CIA, NSA temporarily, and get bashed, you're now in CIA, go

1435

01:40:34,980 --> 01:40:37,680

out there, do your thing, and then come back. And then we'll

1436

01:40:37,740 --> 01:40:42,300

make use NSA again, also to kind of like, can't share too many

1437

01:40:42,300 --> 01:40:44,970

operational details. But those  
are the kinds of things that we

1438

01:40:44,970 --> 01:40:50,880

have to do, because. But I  
didn't see a lot of Dia people

1439

01:40:50,880 --> 01:40:55,530

on it. So using that, as an  
extension, it's conceivable that

1440

01:40:55,530 --> 01:40:59,310

a program, they may have fact of  
knowledge that we're exploiting

1441

01:40:59,850 --> 01:41:03,180

these vehicles, alien  
reproduction vehicles, or

1442

01:41:03,180 --> 01:41:06,720

whatever you want to call them.  
The fact of is one thing, but

1443

01:41:06,720 --> 01:41:10,290

knowledge of the programmatics  
the funding the logistics,

1444

01:41:11,010 --> 01:41:14,340

that's another whole nother  
level. And in our program, we

1445

01:41:14,340 --> 01:41:19,980

use trees. So if you are briefed  
on a certain tree, you know, so

1446

01:41:19,980 --> 01:41:24,360

much, if you brief on another  
tree, you know, so much more. We

1447

01:41:24,360 --> 01:41:29,070  
had a whole bunch of trees. So  
you know, if if you owe your

1448

01:41:29,070 --> 01:41:32,490  
brief that the Elm level, the  
old tree level, or you know,

1449

01:41:32,490 --> 01:41:36,510  
this much, I need to brief you  
at the oak tree level, you know,

1450

01:41:36,630 --> 01:41:41,490  
I mean, it's, that's the kind of  
thing you know, so. So that was

1451

01:41:41,490 --> 01:41:47,610  
not redacted at all. And I was  
surprised that CIA, let me say

1452

01:41:47,610 --> 01:41:50,490  
that we had our intelligence  
relationship with pizza profit

1453

01:41:50,490 --> 01:41:50,880  
China.

1454

01:41:51,420 --> 01:41:55,290  
John Greenwald: Yeah. I was not  
expecting that when you started

1455

01:41:55,290 --> 01:41:58,650  
talking about that. So I'm  
surprised. John, I can talk to

1456

01:41:58,650 --> 01:42:02,850  
you all day, I hope that you  
enjoyed your experience here.

1457

01:42:03,120 --> 01:42:07,500  
And, and I really do appreciate  
on behalf of my audience, your

1458

01:42:07,500 --> 01:42:10,290  
time just coming aboard and  
fielding all these questions.

1459

01:42:10,290 --> 01:42:13,170  
And let me pick your brain here  
for the last 90 minutes or so.

1460

01:42:13,170 --> 01:42:15,900  
So thank you for that. And I  
hope you'll come back, because

1461

01:42:15,900 --> 01:42:18,750  
it sounds like we would have  
quite a few more things to talk

1462

01:42:18,750 --> 01:42:19,140  
about.

1463

01:42:20,070 --> 01:42:23,970  
John Ramirez: Thank you, John.  
And you actually, you helped us

1464

01:42:24,750 --> 01:42:28,440  
kind of close the loop on our  
very first meeting together. And

1465

01:42:28,440 --> 01:42:31,770  
I think that's one of the  
charming stories of my time at

1466

01:42:31,770 --> 01:42:35,700  
CIA is that I actually met you.  
And now I'm meeting you in

1467

01:42:35,700 --> 01:42:41,220

providing and sharing some of my experiences at CIA when I

1468

01:42:41,220 --> 01:42:44,220

couldn't do that when I first met you. Yeah, I'm happy to

1469

01:42:44,250 --> 01:42:45,330

appear again with you.

1470

01:42:45,360 --> 01:42:47,670

John Greenwald: Thank you. Yeah. And I appreciate that. And

1471

01:42:47,670 --> 01:42:50,940

thank you all for listening and watching. Make sure if you are

1472

01:42:50,940 --> 01:42:54,240

on Youtube, just go ahead and click that thumbs up button. It

1473

01:42:54,240 --> 01:42:56,370

really does help the channel a lot to make sure you're

1474

01:42:56,370 --> 01:42:59,160

subscribed to the channel as well. If you're listening on the

1475

01:42:59,160 --> 01:43:02,550

audio podcast platforms, or if you're not aware, these types of

1476

01:43:02,550 --> 01:43:05,700

interviews get forwarded to every platform including

1477

01:43:05,910 --> 01:43:10,260

Spotify, iTunes, wherever your

podcast aggregator of choices,

1478

01:43:10,260 --> 01:43:13,380

make sure you look under the  
black vault radio. I shoot for

1479

01:43:13,380 --> 01:43:16,800

five stars but reviews very much  
help. I won't tell you what to

1480

01:43:16,800 --> 01:43:19,920

put but again, that five star  
Mark is what we shoot for. Thank

1481

01:43:19,920 --> 01:43:22,950

you again, John. Thank you all  
for listening and watching. This